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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AS TO RESPONDENT’S BRIEFING
how

Idaho Appellate Rules speciﬁcally identify what and

contents shall be set forth and

contained Within Opening and Responsive Briefs (Rule 35(a)&(b)), describing a speciﬁc

arrangement Within the presentation to

this court.

Appellant (Puckett) has formulated his Opening

Brief as proscribed according t0 these Rules, but Respondent’s brieﬁng lacks any compliance in
content or arrangement, and consequently Puckett’s Reply Brief

is

being formulated so as t0

respond t0 What Bergmann presents, and the arrangement has been tailored t0 correspond to

this

unorthodox presentation reﬂected in Respondent’s Brief.

RESPONDENT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Within Bergmann’s Responsive Brief is a request for attorney fees 0n appeal. Bergmann
contends Puckett’s appeal presents a “bizarre historical case”, such that “an award 0f fees and costs
t0

Sharon would be reasonable, equitable, and required in the

121 as the basis for such request. “Bizarre”
request under
justice”

is

I.

and conducts a

it

C. §12-

not a standard under that statute, and Bergmann’s

upon which any award under that

t0 say nothing is “bizarre” or unreasonable

statute is

when

sheriff’s sale pursuant t0 the execution statutes,

reasonably expect and rely upon the

and

I.

C. §12-121, then alluding t0 “reasonable”, “equitable” and “in the interest 0f

also not a standard

Sufﬁce

is

interest ofjustice” citing

sheriff’s sale in

Ada County

Sheriff’s

measured 0r a valid basis.

a sheriff executes

nor

is it

Department

upon a writ

“bizarre” for Puckett to
to

conduct an execution

accordance with the statutory authority vested in that Agency. The Sheriff is

obligated to perform the statutory duty in the process of serving a writ of execution and executing

a levy upon personal property interests 0f a debtor, pursuant to execution statutes and conduct a
sale as authorized

The

by

statute.

facts establish

Ada County’s

Sheriff’s

Department received the writ of execution,

found the divorce case ﬁle, observed numerous Instruments consistent with a judgment instrument,

and within the sheriffs statutory authority, proceeded
interests

t0 levy

upon

all creditor rights/property

0f Bergmann found within that divorce case ﬁle, and as the record in this appeal conﬁrms,

the sheriff

met every

statutory burden,

and nothing emanated from those

facts

could be seen to

give rise to demonstrate any “irregularity” 0r “additional circumstance” in conducting the sheriff” s
sale as taken place

0n November

13,

20 14. Bergmann has demonstrated no factual basis
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t0 contend

the sheriff violated any statutory provisions regarding execution, levy, notiﬁcations, advertisement

or scheduling the sale, or failed in any

manner to comply With the

within the provisions 0f the execution statutes

When engaging

concern centers around the sale price generated
execution, and the
selling

Bergmann’s

manner

in

interests,

which the

sheriff” s express authority

vested

those acts; rather Bergmann’s only

at the sale,

being consumed by the costs of

sheriff selected t0 utilize a

one unit

sale

method when

having received n0 other direction from Bergmann, as she, being the

Debtor, declined t0 attend the sale, by such failure, has waived any dissatisfaction with the method
utilized in the sale process

and

is

estopped from challenging the

Though Bergmann would prefer t0 expand the

among

a relationship

sale, as

addressed hereinafter.

“historical analysis”

of this controversy into

individuals, the only “historical” considerations of interest to this court

that creditor—debtor relationship

is

between Puckett and Bergmann, not any former spouse 0r friend

of either party.
This case came t0 exist because

owed

to him,

and the avoidance

Bergmann has

failed t0

pay Puckett the obligation she

that continued over the ensuing years. This appeal concerns the

disputed validity of a sheriffs sale undertaken upon Puckett’s request to the sheriff to execute

upon

his

judgment, having endured years of asset concealment and continuing failure t0 address

this obligation

Bergmann owed t0 him.

Puckett’s involvement has been a request for statutory enforcement of the laws
available t0 the general public t0 enforce recovery

upon a judicially created

obligation granted

What the Ada County Sheriffs Department involvement has done

the courts;

made
by

to undertake

enforcement of those laws, an enforcement the sheriffhas taken an oath to uphold and t0 discharge
in accordance with the statutory authority vested within the sheriffs department

Legislature.
merit, as

the duty

None of

it is

by

this

conduct

is

by

the Idaho

bizarre, frivolous, unreasonable, 0r Without foundation 0r

a statutorily entitlement and a duty statutorily established for a sheriff to carry out

the law enforcement agency proscribed

by

the legislature for

Which the

sheriff has

taken the solemn oath t0 uphold and perform.

As

t0 foundation

and merit, Puckett possessed a lawful and enforceable judgment against

Bergmann; lawfully sought execution of that judgment through issuance 0f a writ from the court
clerk, authorizing the sheriff t0 enforce that judgment against

not exempt from execution, as a judgment creditor

is

any personal property 0f the debtor,

required under statute t0 ﬁrst pursue

enforcement against personal property interests 0f a debtor.
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By

October, 2014, Bergmann’s

obligation to Puckett exceeded $173,000.00, reﬂected in the writ of execution issued

by the

court.

This appeal, seeking t0 validate a sheriff” s statutorily conducted sheriff” s sale, should never

be regarded as frivolous, Without merit, 0r foundation, as there exists a presumption of validity

imbedded within the

statutory fabric

and framework of the

legislative

enactments that are to be

discharged by the law enforcement agencies 0f the respective sheriff departments, and these

proceedings are to be upheld and enforced by the judicial system, absent any statutory nom-

compliance or qualifying “irregularity” in the sale process, as further addressed hereinafter.
Neither Bergmann’s “subjective preference” and resulting disappointment With this
sheriffs sale, nor the lower court’s “subjective preference” t0 override the sheriffs authority in

method 0f

selecting the

make

that selection,

sale process reﬂects

sale, Will

and the

facts

ever be allowed to usurp the authority vested in the sheriff t0

of this sale are undisputed and the manner and method of the

what represents the “relevant

legal standards”

and “rationale”

in this controversy, as the only legal standards applicable for reviewing the selected
is

the requirement 0f the debtor t0 be present at the sale, a requirement

execution statutes, and the only question presented

is

would

the sale,

like to see

When

neither

be applied

method 0f sale

embedded Within

the

Whether the sheriff conducted the sale Within

the boundaries of the authority statutorily vested in the sheriff, not

court

to

what Bergmann or the lower

having been done, a subjective preference they have chosen t0 voice after

Bergmann was

in attendance at the sale,

statutory basis or right to express a subj ective preference in

and the lower court having n0

how the

sheriff conducts the selection

0f the method of sale, and the absence of any pre-emptive authority t0 override the performance
of the sheriff acting Within the boundaries 0f his vested authority.

The standard
statutes,

none of Which

to the sale
at

that applies in these matters is
is

is

in the language identiﬁed in the

unconstitutional or ambiguous, and the relevant legal standard pertaining

0f multiple personal property

a sheriff” s sale

embraced

articles, items,

0r instruments levied

upon and being sold

conditioned only upon the debtor’s attendance and direction to the sheriff, and

should a debtor want a sheriff t0 offer such interests t0 the public independently or separately,
rather than offered as a single unit sale, the debtor
to sell

at the sale t0 instruct the sheriff

such interests separately, should the debtor truly and reasonably believe the interests are

capable 0f being sold t0 an advantage

if

offered separately, but

declines to instruct the sheriff, the selection in the

of the

must be present

sheriff,

method 0f sale

and constitutes a binding disposition

APPELLANT’S REPLYBRIEF — PA GE
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When
is

a debtor fails t0 appear and

vested Within the prerogative

in the sale process.

There
authority,

no

is

and

if

“irregularity” 0r “additional circumstance”

a debtor fails to

instruction to the sheriff, there

is

comply With the

no valid basis

when a sheriff acts Within his vested

statutory pre-requisite of attendance

t0 challenge a sale,

and should Bergmann claim

her failure t0 attend was a misunderstanding offhe law, the long-standing axiom in the law

any misunderstanding of the law
This appeal

is

conﬁned

no basis

is

t0 the

provisions of the execution statutes

to challenge the validity

Ada County

when

Sheriff’s

of the

is

that

sale.

Department compliance With the

discharging the duty t0

the execution statutes, following the sheriff’s levy

and

sell

Bergmann’s

interests

under

upon Bergmann’s non-exempt personal

property interests found in an 01d divorce case ﬁle. The clerk 0f the court issued the Writ 0f

Execution requested by Puckett, authorizing the sheriff to levy upon interests in a case ﬁle, and
the sheriff levied

upon and seized all 0f Bergmann’s non-exempt personal property interests found

within that divorce case ﬁle, entitled Smith

v.

rights/property interests found in that case ﬁle

Smith,

CV-DR-1990-12684. None 0f the

creditor

were exempt, and nothing has been presented

t0

suggest the sheriff exceeded his authority t0 execute upon the entire case ﬁle contents. There has

been n0 challenge

to the sheriff’s

compliance With the statutory notiﬁcation and advertisement

requirements regarding the intended sale 0f those interests as well.

The challenge Bergmann has embraced stems from

lower court’s “subjective

the

preference” that a sale must generate funds in excess 0f the costs of execution or

it

becomes

“grossly inadequate” and the interests must be offered for sale separately, 0r that constitutes an
“irregularity” in the sale. Neither 0f those “preferences”

0f a court are required 0r established

standards recognized in the law.

There

is

n0 dispute the

sheriff is authorized

by law t0 levy upon

all

of the property interests

found Within that case ﬁle, and not just one Instrument, but Bergmann, and the lower court want
to

impose a duty upon the sheriff

to sell the rather conﬂicting

and overlapping

interests t0 the

public separately, despite being contained in a single divorce ﬁle stemming from a judgment and

decree 0f divorce. Neither the lower court nor

language contained in the

statute.

Bergmann can support

Bergmann and

with any

the lower court have ignored the law that the

sheriff is authorized t0 sell personal property articles, items

When

their preferences

and interests as a single unit, especially

seeking t0 avoid any conﬂict due t0 the overlap of What appeared t0 be various conﬂicting

interests

among

the Instruments found within that divorce case ﬁle.

nature 0f a “judgment”, stemming from one divorce that
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The Instruments were

commenced over thirty years

ago.

in the

Bergmann has

failed to cite a legal requirement or statutory basis t0 support the duty she

seeks t0 impose upon a sheriff to conduct a sale in the manner she
attend the sale to advocate 0r

tell

the sheriff

Bergmann to now seek an award of fees and

knowing Puckett has no

to the injury she has

imposed by

that

upon

her,

prefers, yet declined to

was on November

costs against Puckett,

for the language in the statute thatplaces a duty

the sheriff, well

what

now

2014, and for

13,

upon her neglect and disregard

Bergmann’ s

failure to attend

control over the levy 0r sale process, merely adds insult

this frivolous challenge, as

Bergmann

is

the one

who

a lawful process, after failing in her statutory obligation t0 appear and instruct, and
the one

who

and instruct

has encouraged a lower court to impose

its

subj ective preferences,

is

attacking

Bergmann

When n0

is

standard

will support the subj ective propositions 0f the lower court.

Whether Bergmann had an “extremely contentious, expensive and painful
one (0r possibly

all)

of her former spouses, the only concern to

execution statutes by the sheriff on
irrelevant to Puckett,

November

and equally irrelevant

13,

this court is

2014, and

t0 the merits

0f

all

statutes,

war” With

compliance with the

0f Bergmann’s divorces are

this appeal.

actions 0f the sheriff” s Department, the enforcement 0f the laws

civil

The focus

is

upon

embraced by the execution

and the lawful actions undertaken by the sheriff in the discharge of those statutory

The

facts Within this appeal

the

duties.

demonstrate the sheriff lawfully executed his levy upon

all

0f

the property interests found Within the certain divorce case ﬁle he examined, and lawfully sold all

of Bergmann’s property

interests contained Within that divorce case ﬁle,

Smith

v.

Smith,

CV-DR-

1990-12684, as the statute allows a sheriff t0 conduct within his prerogative.

Bergmann’s
0f attorney
regard,

it

fees; if

would be

recital

of a “background” Within her Brief provides no support for any award

any “history” 0r “background”
ﬁtting t0 describe

is

to

be injected into

this

brieﬁng in any other

Bergmann’s concealment of assets, conversion of disposable

income, converted into equity and contributions t0 retirement and pension accounts, 0r creating

encumbrances and claiming non-qualifying dependents, such as

it

has been reﬂected Within the

pleadings pertaining t0 the distribution 0f increased payments t0 her creditors.

It

would be

this

“history” that serves t0 reﬂect the episodes Puckett has experienced, left to pursue the levy and
sale

0f creditor rights/property

Bergmann’s request
sale

“was s0

substantially

set aside the sheriffs sale

interests that

Bergmann had not transferred t0 a third party.

for attorney fees

and legally ﬂawed
0f November

13,
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is

premised upon the disingenuous belief the

that the trial court

was

left

sheriff” s

without any option but t0

2014”. If any 0f that were to be true, would not the

lower court be inclined to

cite

persuasive authority to support that exercise 0f discretion, rather

than just a subj ective preference? In like fashion, would not
authority

upon Which she

court nor

Bergmann

relies to support

Bergmann demonstrate

such a conclusion?

Why

d0

we ﬁnd

citing authority to support the contention the sheriff’s sale

the statutory

neither the lower

was

substantially

and legally ﬂawed?

Such a proposition
appellate courts

When

inconsistent With the application and prior expressions of the

addressing these execution statutes and the authority vested in a sheriff.

Bergmann has declined
sheriff” s sale

is

t0 cite the authority to support her right t0

when declining to participate in the sale,

to demonstrate in

what manner the

sheriff

now

challenge the conduct of a

as the statute allows.

Bergmann has declined

exceeded his authority When pursuing the statutory

process t0 the completion 0f a sheriff sale in the exercise 0f the sheriff” s statutory authority.

Ada County

Sheriff’s

Department

is

among

the

most sophisticated

civil

departments in

Idaho, aware of the statute authority that guides their deputies through the process 0f execution,
levy, notices, advertisement,

and the manner in which

t0

conduct a sheriff’s sale in accordance

with their vested authority and a sheriff’s prerogative under the execution

statutes.

This Department sought t0 be so precise in the execution and levy process against these
personal property interests of Bergmann that the sheriff recorded the Writ of Execution and Notice

0f Levy, as the

interests

were not otherwise available

for

manual delivery

at the sale,

thereby

notifying the public as to the identity of the interests seized, including the entire interests in the

divorce case ﬁle, creating a public record of those proceedings.

For Bergmann t0 argue the issuance of a lawful

writ, authorizing the lawful execution

a lawful and enforceable judgment, properly placed With the statutorily

upon

empowered agency

to

execute and levy upon non-exemptproperty interests ofa debtor, which culminates in a statutorily

conducted

sheriff” s sale, entirely

has acted in a frivolous manner
sale, is yet

beyond any control 0f Puckett, would support a claim that Puckett

When

protecting the validity 0f a statutorily conducted sheriff” s

another disingenuous and hypocritical position proffered by a debtor

Who

has avoided

her obligation t0 Puckett for two decades.

As

identiﬁed hereinafter, the lower court has embraced but a “subjective preference” and

not any “legal standards” 0r “governing law” in addressing this sale dispute, as

more

directly

reﬂected in the decision on the motion for reconsideration, also addressed in detail hereinafter.
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The lower court has expressed only personal opinions, not “applicable standards” and not regard
for the statutory authority that pertains to these sheriff sales.

Bergmann

seeks attorney fees

when

embrace the standards and case authority
standard” within
to

requires.

this court

is

the lower court correctly

The lower court has not

announced

interests sold at the sheriff sale.

property interests

Bergmann nor

analysis to vacate the sale, and the ruling

its

undermine even the requirement

when reviewing

neither

“standard”

sheriff as the debtor’s preferred

upon Puckett’s reconsideration serves

in

2018 regarding property valuations

The applicable standard when

is

that the debtor

manner of

must be present

sale, or the

The language

in the execution statutes control the

at the sale

and

direct the

to the validity

of the

sale.

manner of sale, and Bergmann’s property

were lawfully levied upon, lawfully advertised
total

selling personal

belated challenge and objection will be

deemed waived and the debtor estopped from advancing any challenge

undertaken in

any “applicable

identiﬁed Within the execution statute relied upon by the sheriff in conducting

this sale, as the controlling

interests

cited

for sale,

and lawfully sold

compliance With the statutory authority vested in the

sheriff.

at the sale

Bergmann can be

neither a prevailing party in this appeal nor entitled to attorney fees under the cited statute.

The case law has established that an award 0f attorney’s

made

in a

fees under I.C. §12-121 cannot

be

number 0f instances, including questions presented either as a matter of ﬁrst impression,

Oldcastle Precast, Inc.

v.

Parktowne

C0nstr., Ina, 142 Idaho 376, 379, 128 P.3d 913,

a novel question not previously considered by the court,

Hoagland

v.

Ada

Cnly.,

916 (2005),

154 Idaho 900,

916, 303 P.3d 587, 603 (2013), 0r an unsettled area 0f law being raised 0n the facts presented,

Stewart

v.

Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 681, 152 P.3d 544, 552 (2007) (“The previously unsettled state

0fthe law 0n the characterization 0f professional goodwill makes an award 0f attorney’ s fees under
§ 12-121 inappropriate.”). Also, see generally

Wyman

v.

Eck, 161 Idaho 723, 727, 390 P.3d 449,

453 (201 7) (“Fees will generally not be awarded for arguments
argument.’ Easterling

v.

that are

based 0n a good

faith legal

Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 918, 367 P.3d 1214, 1230 (2016).”).

This controversy does not meet any requirements of I. C. §12—121, as nothing

is

frivolous

about defending the authority of a sheriff t0 conduct a lawfully sheriff’s sale in accordance with
his vested authority

and

in

compliance with the execution

statutes,

interpretations 0f the provisions Within the statute consistently

Court for decades.
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and relying upon controlling

embraced by the Idaho Supreme

The lower court has

n0

cited

abuse of discretion

to contest this

concept of attorney fees under
standard set out

legal authority t0 support setting aside this sheriff’s sale,

not Without merit

is

684 P.2d 307 (Ct.App.1984) where

conduct.

If

a party seeks to enforce the law.

The

C. §12-121 requires the application 0f the long-established

I.

by the Idaho Court 0f Appeals

A misperception

When

and

in

Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar

C0.,

106 Idaho 905,

Court established the standard:

that

0f law 0r 0f one’s

interest

under the law

is

not,

by

itself,

unreasonable

were, Virtually every case controlled by a question of law would entail an

it

attorney fee award against the losing party under LC. §12-121. Rather, the question

must

be Whether the position adopted by the owner was not only incorrect but so plainly
fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable 0r Without foundation. 106 Idaho
at 91 1, 684 P.2d at 313.
See

also,

Herbst

v.

Bothof Dairies, Ina, 110 Idaho 971, 975, 719 P.2d 1231, 1235

(Ct.App.1986), where the court stated:

“The standard

award should be made is not
whether the position urged by the non-prevailing party is ultimately found to be wrong, but
whether it is so plainly fallacious as t0 be frivolous.”); and Gulf Chemical Employees
Federal Credit Union V. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984)
(“[A] claim

not necessarily frivolous 0r lacking in merit simply because

a matter 0f law. Rather, the question

fails as
is

is

for determining Whether such an

so plainly

fallacious

that

it

is

Whether the claim

it

ultimately

when made and pursued,

can be termed frivolous, unreasonable 0r without

foundation”).

Attorney fees under §12-121 require a “prevailing party” and a position taken by the party
that

was not only

but so plainly fallacious that

incorrect,

unreasonable, or without foundation. See Snipes

v.

it

could be deemed frivolous,

Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265

(Ct.App. 1 997).

When

it

dependent upon
the sale as he

comes
its

own

deems

to execution statutes
set

0f

facts,

and the performance 0f a

sheriff,

each case

and the sheriff is vested With statutory authority

is

to conduct

appropriate, subject to the restraints expressed Within the statute, and

when

the issue involves the failure of a debtor to participate and instruct the sheriff in that sale process,
the sheriff cannot be held to have mis—used his statutory authority t0 conduct the sale.

has

its

particular circumstances,

and

this

Each dispute

controversy pertains t0 the actions of a sheriff that were

undertaken in the exercise 0f his vested authority under the

statute, in the

absence 0f a debtor,

were subjected

to sale

upon

with notiﬁcation of the levy and right to submit claim forms was served by the

sheriff,

along with

failing to attend the sale

further notiﬁcation

Where the debtor’s property

by her own

attorney.
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interests

levy,

Puckett’s obj actives t0 preserve the validity 0f this lawful sale and secure consistent rulings
that preserve consistency with the statutory

unreasonable, nor frivolous, and though

it is

decision of the lower court reversed, there

Bergmann’s request

purpose of the Legislature cannot be deemed

perceived the law demands the sale be upheld and the

is

no basis

for attorney’s fees under

LC.

§

award attorney

to

fess against Puckett,

and

12-121 must be rejected.

REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
“FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND”

I.

This controversy
litigation arising

is

not t0 be regarded “yet another case added to the long

from the Smith

from an unrelated

litigation in

v.

and through

Smith divorce action, CV-DR-1990-12684”. This appeal stems

Which Royal Von Puckett (“Puckett”) obtained a judgment against

Sharon Kay Smith (“Bergmann”)
Puckett,

0f additional

list

litigation

t0 recover

upon an obligation

Puckett obtained his

for

which she remains indebted

money judgment

against

to

Bergmann.

Following that award, Puckett experienced routine concealment of any valuable assets by
effectively shielding 0r concealing assets, culminating in an execution in October,

2014 against

Bergmann’s

had not been

creditor rights/property interests held in a decades 01d divorce ﬁle that

assigned t0 a third party. Pursuant t0 the execution statutes, Puckett sought enforcement against
personal property, as

was so

instructed

by the

sheriff.

Puckett has been “a long term client and friend of Vernon K. Smit

Bergmann, and Smith remained counsel
Puckett and Smith are familiar with

for Puckett throughout the

Bergmann and her propensities

in

”,

many

the eX-husband of

decades, and both

many respects, and Puckett

sought counsel’s assistance to effectuate some recovery on his judgment.

The “procedural” background
between Bergmann, Puckett or

relevant t0 this appeal d0 not concern the relationship

his counsel, but solely

upon whether

the

Ada County

Sheriff’s

Department properly executed the writ 0f execution and levy upon creditor rights/property
interests

owned by Bergmann

in the identiﬁed divorce case ﬁle t0

Ada County, and whether the statutory sheriff notiﬁcations,

be found in the

district court in

advertisement, and sale

was conducted

in accordance With the authority vested in the sheriff under the execution statutes.

Beyond

that, the

only relevant “Factual and Procedural Background” that has be recited

within pp. 4-6 of Respondent’s Brief is the procedural background identiﬁed in the Clerk’s Record,

which

traditionally should

be identiﬁed within the content and arrangement as “Course 0f

Proceedings Below” had Bergmann’s brief been properly formulated
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when ﬁled with

this court.

“STANDARD OF REVIEW”

II.

Bergmann presented
Opening

Brief.

N0

a “standard 0f Review” consistent With what Puckett identiﬁed in his

controversy

is

presented as to What Will be the review upon this appeal.

This court will determine whether the lower court abused
statutorily

conducted sheriff’s

based upon the

sale,

its

discretion

When

vacating a

facts, the statutes, the sheriff’s authority, the

applicable standards and interpretation of the execution statutes in question, and the failure of the

debtor t0 be present at the sale, thereby waiving any basis t0 challenge 0r raise an objection as t0
the

manner

in

which the

sheriff selected to sell the property rights in a single unit than separately.

This court Will determine Whether the lower court perceived the issue as one 0f discretion,

and Whether acting within the outer
and statutory authority
with

standards

the

to

I.

of its discretion, consistent with relevant legal standards

be applied, and reached a decision upon an exercise 0f reason, consistent

and

that

statutes

execution/levy/sale process in the

identiﬁed within

limits

vest

authority

manner he did under

within

the

conduct

sheriff t0

this

the execution statutes, as that authority

is

C. §§1 1-201, 301, 302, and 304.

This court will determine whether the lower court’s exercise 0f discretion was undertaken
within the framework ofthe standards and applicable statutes comprising the “governing law”, 0r was
it

instead just based

some

upon a

subj ective preference the lower court has inj ected t0 conclude there

was

“irregularity” 0r “attendant circumstances” in the sale process to set aside this statutorily

conducted

sheriff’s sale

0n November

13, 2014.

This “Standard 0f Review”, presented by both Puckett and Bergmann, has identiﬁed a
recent case from the

Supreme Court,

entitled Safaris Unlimited,

LLC v.

Von Jones, Idaho Supreme

Court Docket No. 44914, 421 P.3d 205 (2018), and as addressed in that appeal,
Court Will determine whether the

district court in this case:

relevant legal standards”, and (4) reached a decision

by

.....

“(3)

this

Appellate

Acted consistently With

the exercise 0f reason”.

In Safaris Unlimited, supra, this court held that the lower court failed to act consistently

With relevant standards, and had not conducted aproper application offhe governing law. (Safaris
Unlimited, Supra, 421 P.3d at 217). This case presents a similar concern and inquiry regarding the
relevant standards, and proper application 0f the governing law as
authority t0 conduct the sale in the
analysis,

manner done with

Whether the lower court abused

conducted sheriff’s

sale,

its

relates t0 the sheriff” s

selling this personal property,

discretion in setting aside a valid

performed pursuant to the execution
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it

and from

that

and lawfully

statutes that control these matters.

III.

“DISCRETION” USED IN SETTING ASIDE THE SHERIFF’S SALE

A.

ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SALE

B.

III.

Bergmann has argued
sheriffs sale, though

the lower court did not abuse

Bergmann has declined

t0 identify

its

discretion

When

setting aside the

What standard has been applied, or what

reasoning supports an undisclosed standard relied upon, and t0 that point, none has been identiﬁed

with any speciﬁcity within the

What appears

t0

Memorandum

Decision and Order of the lower court, other than

be a “subjective preference” regarding “description” 0f interests levied upon and

sold, the belief “costs

of execution” can cause a sale price t0 be “grossly inadequate”, “as a matter

0f law”, and the lower court wants t0 override the sheriff’s prerogative t0 conduct the sale as he
did, expressing a subj ective preference that contradicts the statute, as

by a

court regarding this

manner 0f sale, given

any direction from the debtor
There

is

n0

which

at the sale,

the absence 0f debtor’s attendance and the lack 0f
constitutes a waiver t0

any challenge by the debtor.

statutory restraint 0r case authority t0 prevent the sheriff

property interests 0f Bergmann, within his

and overlapping creditor

judgment and decree,

own prerogative when

selling

from

selling the

what may be conﬂicting

rights reﬂected in a divorce case ﬁle, selecting t0 sell the interests as a

What appears

single unit, rather than separate

would

no obligation can be imposed

that

t0

be the uncertain instruments pertaining t0 a divorce

would be of concern

to the public for fear

of overlap 0r conﬂict.

Why

the sheriff want to engage the public in a potential of competing interests at a sale?

The lower court vacated

the sale because 0f “subjective preferences”, not a standard that

has been established and found t0 have been violated. The lower court disregards the statute that
vests within the sheriff the authority to sell personal property articles, items,

the

manner he deems

sale,

appropriate, the

same way they were being

and only the debtor has a vested right under the

and instruments

in

advertised, as a single unit for

statute to instruct to the contrary, if at

attendance.

A sheriff is not required by statute to conduct a sale in a manner preferred by a lower court,
absent attendance and a disregard 0f any direction from the debtor in the sequence 0f the sale
items. There

is

n0 basis

in

law

to allow a

0f the sheriff t0 require him t0
interest,

when

sell

lower court to undermine or usurp the statutory authority

any one 0r more

articles, items, 0r

instruments as a separate

part of a divorce case ﬁle with potentially competing, conﬂicting, or overlapping

interests Within

one divorce case ﬁle that could be sold as a single unit
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t0 assure

n0 competing,

conﬂicting, or overlapping ownership, once sold.

Bergmann cannot run from the

attend the sale and waiver her statutory right to request a different

fact she failed to

manner 0f a sequence

in the sale

process.

Bergmann does not challenge

the Sheriff’s process 0f execution

the divorce case ﬁle contents; does not challenge

all

and levy upon the

all

of

property interests claimed by her were

advertised for sale as a composite of interests, in accordance With the statutory notice requirements;

does not challenge the non-exempt status 0f her property

was

interests;

directed to the divorce case ﬁle from the instruction

made by Bergmann

is

by

does not challenge the Sheriff

Puckett; rather the only challenge

an “uncertain description”, a “grossly inadequate” sale price generated

the auction, and selling the interests as a single unit, concerns presented

Despite Bergmann’s challenge,
prohibits a sheriff

from

selling interests that could

overlapping as a single unit
at the sale,

Bergmann can

sale, rather

by

the lower court.

point t0 n0 statute 0r case authority that

be conﬂicting, competing, and potentially

than as separate items, absent the presence 0f the debtor

and a disregard Ofa directivefrom

the debtor at the time 0fthe sale.

Presented With the subjective preference and analysis 0f the lower court, Where
authority that allows a lower court to override a sheriff” s prerogative in the selection in the

of the
he

sale,

may

When there

sell

is

n0

statutory prohibition that restricts the selection in the

such potentially overlapping, and competing

debtor and an instruction t0

sell the articles,

statutory Violation to support

any

What

this

at

interests,

of the

the

manner

manner in which

save for the presence of the

items 0r interests separately?

irregularity in the process

is

There has been no

sale.

Court Will undertake in reviewing the issues in

“standard” and upon what “reasoning” the lower court considered

this

when

must be found the lower court acted consistently With “relevant

appeal

is

upon What

setting aside the sale.

legal standards”

It

and the

“applicable interpretation 0f the sheriffs authority” under the execution statutes and conducted a

“proper application” 0f the “governing 1aw”” (Safaris Unlimited, Supra, 163 Idaho 874, 886, 421

P.3d 205, 217) (2018), 0r the Order setting aside the sale will be reversed and the validity of the
sale

conﬁrmed.

What

appears t0 be the “standard” and the “reasoning” involved in the analysis was a

“subj ective standard” and a “subj ective preference”, neither 0f Which
the lower court has chosen t0 substitute
sheriff has

been

its

is

a recognized analysis, as

preference 0f a “two unit sale” over that t0 what the

statutorily vested t0 determine in his selective discretion
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and prerogative

t0

conduct a “one unit sale”, the appropriate manner in Which these interests could be better sold in

from the debtor.

the conduct of the sale t0 avoid overlap or competing interests, absent direction

The lower court has never identiﬁed any
requirements in these procedures, be

it

failure

of the sheriff t0 comply With the statutory

the writ of execution, the levy, the recording of the Writ

and Notice 0f Levy, the mailing 0f the claim forms, the posting 0f notices, the advertisement 0f
the sale, or the scheduling of sale.

Bergmann’s

frustration includes concern over the imposition 0f sheriff fees that

the sale proceeds, and prefers there

had been two judgment

interests sold separately,

they were not, raises concern over “description” 0f what was sold,
a single unit sale, which

Bergmann claims

When

all interests

constitutes an “irregularity” in the sale.

consumed

and because

were sold

N0

as

statute or

case law supports their “grossly inadequate” sale price theory 0r the “two unit sale” position, as
sheriff fees are not a

component 0f the

sale price but a function

selling property interests or articles 0r items as a single unit

sheriffhas, especially

by

of the execution process, and

the sheriff

is

a statutory right the

when seeking t0 avoid any potential conﬂict, competing or overlap potential,

absent the presence 0fthe debtor and an expressed directionfrom the debtor at the sale.

There

is

n0 showing the

Bergmann cannot

sale failed to

comply with

the provisions 0f

I.

C. §11-304, and

point to any statutory proceedings t0 have been violated t0 establish a factual

basis t0 challenge any of the proceedings, nor has there

been shown a “standard”

legal or factual basis to challenge the single unit sale process

deemed

the best

t0 justify

any

method 0f selling

the interests, in the absence 0f the debtor at the sale.

Bergmann,

in lockstep With the

lower court, expresses her “subjective preference”

regarding the “process” 0f the sale, something she should have expressed t0 the sheriff 0n

November
unit sale

13,

by

2014,

if wanting the interests sold in

the sheriff.

weeks 0r months

the sheriff that requires the sheriff t0 read the

Upon What basis can
Where

is

is

later.

Where

is

deﬁne the adequacy of a

becomes “grossly inadequate” when
the “standard” that the

responsible to describe the property interests levied

at the sheriffs sale?

debtor.

the lower court use “costs of execution” t0

the “standard” that a “sale price”

to the sheriff at

There can be n0 “standard” imposed upon

mind 0f an absent

costs 0f execution exceed the sale’s proceeds?

(Puckett)

other than as planned as a single

Bergmann’s “subjective preference” must be announced

the day of the sale, not to a judge

sale price?

some manner

judgment

the

creditor

upon and being sold by the

sheriff

Neither 0f these non-existent “standards” are found anywhere in the case law
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or execution statutes.

What
is to

the lower court sought to accomplish, expressed within

impose a non-existent right ofjudicial substitution 0f the

its

“subj ective preference”,

sheriff” s prerogative

with the court’s

preference for determining the manner of the sale, preferring to require the sheriff,

0f some uncertain judgment/order type instruments

t0 sell a debtor’s property interests that consist

levied

upon from within an old divorce

when he goes

case, that the sheriff must render a “legal opinion”

how to

avoid any overlapping claims and separate out competing 0r conﬂicting interests, irrespective 0f
the fact the interests are in potential conﬂict and overlapping effects Within the instruments and a
sheriff is not required t0

make

a “legal opinion” so as t0

sell the interests separately,

faced with

renewals with no amounts, with orders amending judgments, While the entire interests stem from

an ancient divorce contained in one ﬁle that would better be presented as a bundle of uncertain
interests that

have

laid

dormant for almost a quarter century and sold as a single unit for one ﬁnal

bid sale price, rather than engage in creating potential claims forthcoming from the bidding public.
In addition t0 this “subjective preference”, the lower court also wants the sheriff to

overlook the statutory requirement a debtor
thoughts on

how

to

selling the potentially conﬂicting

interests

obligated to be at the sale t0 express the debtor’s

market such instruments that are decade’s

“subjective preference” 0f her own. There

from

is

from one divorce case

is

01d, if the debtor truly has

no established “standard”

0f sale

ﬁle.

statute requires a debtor to attend the sale

is

to ever

Order of April

become a concern

12,

that,

and give instruction

and

that very

purpose

to the sheriff, if the

Order of February

is

method

6,

2015, nor the

2019, cites any “standard” that imposes an obligation upon the

sheriff, in the

absence of the debtor

from

that prohibits the sheriff

and overlapping instruments as one single unit 0f property

Neither the statute nor any case law requires a sheriff to d0

Why the

any

to a debtor. Neither the

at the sale to instruct the sheriff, that in

any manner the

seller is prohibited

selling a debtor’s personal property interests in accordance Within his statutory prerogative.

Though Bergmann

is

aware the sheriff has extensive statutory authority

t0 sell personal

property in such manner he determines appropriate, and despite Bergmann’s absence at the sale,

Bergmann has chosen

t0

now

chosen t0 even blame for the sale process upon Puckett, apparently

realizing the sheriff had performed his obligation under the statute, as

Bergmann now argues

the

following in her Brief:

“The November

13,

2014

Sheriff’s sale purported t0 sell the
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“Judgment” Sharon

holds against Vernon K. Smith in case CV-DR-1990-12684.

As a

0fthe failure of
Puckett t0 adequately identify the personal properly t0 be sold at the Sheriff’s Sale 0n
November 13, 2014
the actual item ofpurported “personal properly” sold cannot be
that Sharon has two judgments against Vernon K. Smith
ascertained. It must be noted
in Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684.” (Resp. Brief, p. 8) (Emphasis added).

Has Bergmann abandoned the argument the
Puckett

where

is at fault

interests

for not telling the sheriff What

sheriff” failed his statutory

he can and cannot levy upon in a divorce case ﬁle

blame on Puckett, arguing his lack of description

create error by placing

of What the sheriff can levy upon 0r

sell,

and

that Puckett caused a sale “irregularity”

completely describing What he wanted sold. Puckett does not

upon and what he could

who

determines what

is

the sheriff

what he could levy

not a “proper standard 0r an application

being sold

is

tell

by not

at

a sheriff” s sale, and such a theory

erroneous.

Neither
statutes

This

sell at the sheriff” s sale.

0f the governing law” as t0
is

duty by now saying

0f the debtor are found that are not exempt from execution?

Bergmann seeks t0

of an error

result

Bergmann nor

the lower court has challenged the proceedings under the execution

on any basis they were unconstitutional, ambiguous, confusing or vague. Neither contend the

applicable statutes

fail t0

provide due process t0 a debtor, as the statute expressly affords the debtor a

right t0 instruct the sheriff as t0 the sell process,

Neither the lower court nor

prove any Violation 0fthe execution

assuming the debtor

is in

Bergmann have any evidence from

statutes; instead

attendance at the sale.
this

voluminous record t0

expressing a subj ective concern over the manner

0fthe single unit sale and lack 0f separation ofwhat is being characterized as two different judgments.

The lower court postulates the
the belief the interests boiled

“subjective preference”.

“subj ective preference”

Bergmann’s

interests

be sold separately (upon

down to two judgments), though providing no

authority t0 support that

Bergmann would argue a

“subjective preference” Puckett

identify property interests being sold, apparently arguing

he controls What

is

is

responsible t0

0r can be levied upon,

possibly asserting the proposition the property seized must be limited t0 the “description” reference

contained in Puckett’s

Bergmann

letter

0f instruction.

fails t0 identify

letter authorizes the sheriff t0

any

statute placing

any obligation 0n Puckett 0r the sheriff as the

execute the writ, and the judgment creditor (Puckett) has n0 control

over what the sheriff ultimately selects t0 levy upon as being non-exempt.

The

sheriff has the statutory duty to levy

upon

determined a property interest claimed by a debtor, and the
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all

non-exempt property, once having

letter

0f instruction serves

t0 initiate the

execution process undertaken under the exclusive authority of the sheriff,
authorized, pursuant to his statutory duty, t0
It is

the sheriff who levies

Who

ﬁnd and levy upon a debtor’s property

upon the non-exempt interests, not the

creditor,

then being

is

interests.

and it

is

the sheriff

Who sells What he has selected to levy upon, not the creditor. The only limitation, controlled by statute,
as to

sheriff may levy

what the

seized until after ﬁrst levying

upon

after delivered a writ

0f execution,

is 1)

real property

may be

upon a debtor’ s personal property, and 2) the personal property interests

must be non—exempt from execution. Puckett has no control over the

upon or the

selection of interests levied

no

selected

manner 0f conducting

sheriff’s

duty in either the

the sale.

Sheriff Departments require a letter 0f instruction so as to engage the sheriff with his approval
t0

commence

sheriff

the writ process, as the letter also provides a statutory element of indemniﬁcation.

wants notiﬁcation of the classiﬁcation 0f the property that

pursued, and a possible location

(if known),

is

known

and any other factors of interest

t0

be available

The

to

be

t0 bring t0 the sheriff s

attention (in Puckett’s case, the sheriff was alerted the debtor has the tendency t0 hide assets).

Puckett did provide the requested

with the

sheriff’s statutory authon'ty,

letter,

asking the sheriff t0 execute the writ in accordance

and informed the sheriff as

to the existence

and location of a

divorce case ﬁle with debtor’s property interests found Within that case ﬁle.

Puckett

made

reference to a “certain judgment”

known

to

be the original divorce judgment

contained within the ﬁle, aware that other instruments were within the ﬁle, also referenced, but
Puckett’s references in no

The

way limited the

sheriff s execution

sheriff located the case ﬁle,

on

all interests

not exempt.

found the original divorce judgment, and found other

Instruments referencing a judgment interest also stemming from the divorce proceedings,
t0 the parties identiﬁed within that case ﬁle.

from execution, and levied upon

all

The

sheriff determined

interests

related

were exempt

0fpr0perty interests in the divorce caseﬁle, consistent With the

sheriff’s authority t0 levy

upon non-exempt

neither the lower court nor

Bergmann have any challenge

done

none ofthe

all

interests that

would be

subject t0 a sheriff’s sale, and

as to the sheriff s authority t0 d0

What was

in that execution process.

Puckett cannot be integrated into this statutory execution process conducted by the sheriff,
as the effect of the letter

was

to place the process With the sheriff, as the statute provides,

and the

sheriff conducted the execution, pursuant t0 the vested authority under the execution statutes.

Once

the execution and levy

Will advertise

and notice a

sale,

is

accomplished, the

proposing t0
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sell

sheriff,

What the

pursuant to statutory authority,

sheriff selected t0 levy upon,

and

it is

the sheriff

who

represents and describes the interests levied

upon and advertised

reﬂected in the notiﬁcations, advertisement, and announcement

Bergmann has provided n0

be

scheduled sheriff’s

at the

authority t0 place any burden

to

upon Puckett

0f Respondent’s Brief), saying Puckett was obligated to describe property,

(as

stating:

sold, as
sale.

sought 0n

p. 8

“As a result 0f

the failure 0f Puckett t0 adequately identify the personal property t0 be sold at the Sheriff’s

November

Sale 0n

13,

the actual item 0f the purported “personal property” sold

2014

cannot be ascertained.

Only the

sheriff,

upon, advertised for
being

was

all

sale,

under the

levy and sale, and the sheriff expressly levied

statute, directs

and sold Bergmann’s property interests {alwavs identiﬁed in the plural}

0f Bergmann’s interests contained in that divorce case ﬁle, not any one particular interest

described, as none were excluded from that single unit sale.

Not only

is

Bergmann’s contention “Puckett

property t0 be sold at the sheriff’s sale”, the record

any

identify

interests the sheriff levied

attend the sale and initiate a credit bid t0

failed t0 adequately identify the personal
is

undisputed Puckett was never asked t0

upon, as Puckett’s limited involvement thereafter was t0

commence the bidding on the

sale

of the property interests

contained in that divorce case ﬁle.
Puckett never told the sheriff What he could not levy upon, as the original divorce judgment

had orders amending

it,

along with a series of renewals of various judgment interests.

related to the divorce,

and n0 renewals had any amounts identiﬁed

any renewal judgment

in 1996.

this

and potentially conﬂicting as

t0

all

property interests,

all

all

as they

were n0 capable of

assortment of Instruments in that divorce case

what each may represent (judgment, Orders

amending judgment, modiﬁcations, renewals) so the

upon

was

any of them, ﬁnding absent

The 1999 judgment was believed void,

renewal in those earlier years. The sheriff saw
ﬁle, overlapping

in

It

sheriff,

Within his statutory authority, levied

non-exempt, and was what the sheriff identiﬁed and described the

property interests {plural} to be what he levied upon, advertised for sale, and announced for sale
at the sheriff” s sale

and sold as a single unit of all

interests contained Within that divorce case ﬁle.

A letter t0 the sheriff does not limit What the sheriff may select t0 levy upon. A letter neither
limits

nor

restricts the sheriffs authority t0

vested authority t0 levy upon

The

all

levy upon debtor’s interests, as the sheriff has the

non-exempt property, as authorized

sheriff described the property interests in the plural,

property interests held and claimed by

Bergmann
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in

I.

C. §1 1-201.

announced

that

he was selling

in that divorce case ﬁle, as

one single

all

unit,

with his

consistent

announcement
in this process,

Bergmann had
in

and had debtor attended the sale,

Code, Which permits execution 0n

I.

as statutorily granted a voice

factual

showing

that

any other manner of sale

better price to the advantage

0f the debtor’s best
t0 the

manner

addressed hereinafter.

The process undertaken by

I.C. §

his

the right t0 propose her “subjective preference” as t0 a different

would have generated a

sale, as

in

interests

The debtor’s absencefrom the sale constitutes a waiver ofany challenge

0fthe single unit

m,

and the sheriff described those

no fashion has there been any

requested, 0r even

interests.

authority,

at the sheriff’s sale,

manner of sale, but

was

statutory

the sheriff
all

was conducted

in accordance With Title 11,

Idaho

non-exempt personal and real property 0f the iudgment

11-201

C. §11-301 similarly permits expansive authority in the sheriff, providing in relevant

part:

sheriff must execute the writ against the property of the judgment debtor by levying
0n a sufficient amount ofproperty if there be sufficient; collecting 0r selling the things
in action, and selling the other property, and paying t0 the plaintiff or his attorney so much

The

0f the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. (Emphasis added)

The

sheriff has extensive authority in conducting the sheriff’s sale, entitled to sell interests

reﬂected in several

articles, items, or

instruments as a single unit, authorized through

304, the only potential limitation 0n that authority

time of the

The

sheriff

Which could be reﬂected
single unit bid item sale,

as

judgment type instruments,

and doing so

The judgment
or of articles

Therein

to

from the debtor,

some

at the

subjectively

bundle personal property

as contained in

C. §1 1-

interests,

one divorce case ﬁle, as a

acting properly and within his statutory authority, creating

The operative language

debtor, ifpresent at the sale,

may

in

I.

C. §1 1-304 provides:

also direct the order in

which property,

when such property consists 0f several known lots 0r parcels,
can
which
be sold t0 advantage separately, and the sheriffmustfollow such

real or personal, shall

directions.

is

instruction

property interests in

had the absolute authority

“irregularity” in the sale process.

to express

upon an

sale, directing the sheriff to sell debtor’s

preferred manner.

no

is

I.

be

sold,

(Emphasis added).

lies

Bergmann’s

any direction as

to

fatal

how

she

and unavoidable

result;

Bergmann

failed t0 attend the sale

may have preferred her interests t0 be

sold t0 any perceived

advantage, well knowing from the notiﬁcation received from both the sheriff and her attorney the
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were always referenced

interests

know the

in the plural,

and

all

persons along with judges, are presumed t0

law.

Idaho law declares that both the general citizenry, as well as
t0

know

v.

Frary, 91 Idaho 322, 327, 420 P.2d 805, 810 (1966).

must

the law. See State

also

comply With

v.

Leavitt, 121

the law. See

Idaho

Bradbury

v.

4, 6,

district

judges, are presumed

822 P.2d 523, 525 (1991); City ofLewiston
It

necessarily follows that district judges

Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 117, 233

P.3d 38, 48 (2009).
In addition to the presumption that the Judge
citizenry (this

would include Bergmann and her

with the law. In Wilson

v.

State,

knows

the law, the law declares the general

attorney), are

presumed

t0

know

(and to comply)

133 Idaho 874, 993 P.2d 1205 (Ct.App.2000), the court announced

that principle in law:

Finally,

it is

axiomatic that citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge 0f the law

once such laws are passed. Atkins

v.

Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130, 105 S.Ct. 2520, 2529, 86

L.Ed.2d 81, 93 (1985); North Laramie Land C0. v. Hoﬂman, 268 U.S. 276, 283, 45 S. Ct.
491, 494, 69 L. Ed. 953, 957 (1925). Ignorance 0f the law is not a defense. Smith v. Zero

980 P.2d 545, 551 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,
926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). “The entire structure 0f our democratic government rests

Defects, Ina, 132 Idaho 881, 887,

0n the premise

that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the
”
particular policies that aﬂect his destiny.
Atkins, 472 U.S. at 131, 105 S. Ct. at 2530, 86

L.Ed.2d

at 94.

133 Idaho

In Texaco, Inc.

v.

Short,

at

880, 993 P.2d at 121

454 U.S. 516, 102

1.

S. Ct.

781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982)

The

US

Court concluded:
It

is

well established that persons owning property Within a State are charged With

knowledge of relevant

statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition 0f such

property. [footnote 25 omitted]

454 U.S.

The

As

text

at 532,

102

S. Ct. at

793.

of the referenced omitted footnote, further declares the following:

stated in

North Laramie Land C0.

v.

Hoﬁ’man, 268 U.S. 276, 283, 45

S. Ct.

491, 494,

69 L. Ed. 953:
“Allpersons are charged with knowledge 0fthe provisions ofstatutes and must take note

0f the procedure adopted by them; and When that procedure is not unreasonable or arbitrary
This is
there are no constitutional limitations relieving them from conforming to it.
especially the case with respect to those statutes relating t0 the taxation 0r condemnation

0f land. Such

statutes are universally in force

which the land owner must take account
and safeguarding his interest in it.”
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and are general

in providing for the

in their application, facts

0f

management 0f his property

See also Anderson National Bank

v.

Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 243, 64 S. Ct. 599, 604, 88 L.

Ed. 692, Where the court stated:

Allpersons havingproperty located within a state and subject t0
note 0f

statutes affecting the control 0r disposition

its

its

dominion must take

0f such property and 0f the

procedure which they set up for those purposes. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 509;
North Laramie Land C0. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283. Proceedings for the assessment
the condemnation of land, the establishment 0f highways and public
improvements affecting landowners, are familiar examples. Hulz‘ng v. Kaw Valley R. &

of taxes,

Imp. C0,, 130 U.S. 559, 563-564; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254-257, 262. 321 U.S.
at

243, 64. S. Ct. at 604-05.

Bergmann and her attorney

are charged With the

knowledge 0f the content 0f the

statutory

provisions that impact Bergmann’s personal property, being the execution statutes, and the burden

was placed upon Bergmann 0r her

attorney, to attend the sale, 0r be foreclosed

about the method in which the property interests were sold in one unit
authorized t0 select that method, absent any direction from

Bergmann

from complaining

lot,

as the sheriff is

at the sale.

Because Bergmann has expressed concern about the content 0f Puckett’s

letter to the

more

in the nature

sheriff (what

it

described) the applicable law regarding such letters appears t0 be

of indemniﬁcation of the

sheriff, essentially protecting the sheriff, in the

wrongful levy, and the sheriff
property, 0r property that

is

someone

event there

came

to

be a

accused of being neglectful by levying upon either exempt
else

owns, not the debtor described in the

writ.

There are ﬁve cases cited within Casemaker4© where reference to the phrase “Letter 0f
Instruction

”
is

addressed; three by the Court 0f Appeals and two

proscribe a limitation
result

upon a

sheriff’s authority t0 execute

of the language expressed Within the

The
wherein

it

statute,

I.

by

the

Supreme Court. None

upon a debtor’s property

interests as a

letter.

C. §31-2211, refers t0 “Directions [to the sheriff] must be in writing”,

provides the following:

“N0

direction 0r authority

by a party or his attorney to a

sheriff, in respect to the

of process or return thereof, or t0 any act 0r omission relating thereto,

is

execution

available t0

discharge 0r excuse the sherifffrom a liability for neglect 0r misconduct, unless it is
contained in a writing, signed by the attorney 0f the party, 0r by the party if he has n0
attorney.

”

(Emphasis added)

That statute appears to be designed to insulate the sheriff from

liability

when

acting

pursuant to a written direction by a judgment creditor in respect t0 the execution process. If the
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sheriff seizes

exempt property 0r property owned by another, the

sheriff

may

assert a right

indemniﬁcation against the judgment creditor, a defense against neglectful conduct. The
the sheriff is not designed to impose a limitation
the duty t0 levy execution

upon property

upon the

interests

sheriff” s ability to

0f

letter t0

execute and discharge

found t0 be non-exempt from execution and

subj ect t0 levy under the writ.

The

sheriff has authority to levy

which

in the writ

ﬁle, entitled

is liable t0

Smith

of the property

v.

upon and

property (See

upon and sold,

C. §31—2206).

I.

party charged in the writ

As

to those

In Jenkins

was

liable to

is

The

upon or

be levied upon and sold, as none

sell

property of the party charged in the

the sheriff is then liable t0 the creditor for the value of such

sheriff has a duty to levy

liable t0

upon

all

property interests that the

be levied upon and sold.

ﬁve cases referenced above,

three involved a sheriff.

Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202, 177 P.3d 949 (2008), the reference

v.

asserts the Sheriff inappropriately requested a letter

was not in compliance With the redemption

able t0

redeem the property even assuming the Sheriff had not requested a
In Peasley Transfer
is: “.

.

.

in

Storage C0.

v.

t0 a letter

statutory requirements, he

would not have been

letter ofinstruction”.

for a

deﬁciency since the sheriff

0f instruction and a valid writ of execution and since Ada County

compliance with the statutes applicable t0 the lawful writ of execution.

In State

v.

“Jenkins

Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 979 P.2d 605 (1999), the

County Defendants

.Peasley could not 100k t0 the

had acted pursuant
had acted

&

is:

0f instruction. However, because Jenkins

Clearly

reference

this divorce case

were exempt from execution.

If the sheriff neglects 0r refuses to levy

writ liable t0 be levied

property interests of the party charged

be levied upon and sold. A11 contents found Within

Smith, CV-DR-1990-12684”,

interests

sell all

Myers, 130 Idaho 440, 942 P.2d 564 (1987), the reference

is:

.

..”.

“The magistrate

held that the sheriff had a right to enter the residence pursuant to the writ 0f possession and an

accompanying

letter

0f instruction from the

requires an ofﬁcer t0

affected

by

remove

the resident and his 0r her personal property

from the premises

the writ.”

The practical purpose of a
sheriff With a classiﬁcation

than indemniﬁcation of the sheriff]

letter [other

0f property

is

interests (in this case, personal property)

location 0f the property interests (in this case,
ﬁle),

landlord's attorney because execution of such a writ

t0 provide the

and a possible

Ada County Court ﬁles and a particular divorce case

With a general description 0fthe property
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interests,

ifknown (in this

case, judgment interests).

Once found, and not exempt,

the property interests are subject t0 levy, pursuant to the Writ 0f

Execution, and t0 be sold by the sheriff at a scheduled sheriff’s

Nowhere Within any

statute 0r the

sale.

above cited case law

a “Letter 0f Instruction” to be

is

construed t0 be a limitation to what the sheriff may or Will ultimately levy upon and
it

upon a

create a limitation 0r restriction

sell,

sheriff’s statutory authority (duty) to

nor does

engage the

execution and levy process upon a classiﬁcation of property interests found not exempt from
execution and

There

owned and held by the

is

is

n0

statute/case

party charged in the writ.

law requiring a judgment creditor (Puckett)

to describe

speciﬁcity any personal property interests the sheriff, in accordance With his authority,

ﬁnd and

select t0 levy upon, as the sheriff selects

what property

interests

with any

may

then

he ultimately will levy

upon, found not t0 be exempt, and the sheriff alone has sole control over any aspect of that
execution/levy/sale process.

Puckett’s limited involvement

Court Clerk, Which he did on October

was
8,

194-198).

0f the Writ 0f Execution from the

2014, and delivered the Writ to the sheriff for execution

(R. pp. 35-36; 45-46; 80-81; 82-83; 110-1

the sheriff t0 proceed to execute, from

to cause issuance

1 1),

along with a

letter

0n October

Which a fee assessment was made and

9,

2014 requesting

paid. (R. pp. 88—92;

Puckett directed the sheriff to a particular divorce case ﬁle that contained personal

property interests reﬂected through a divorce proceeding and divorce judgement and decree,
identifying the debtor (Bergmann) as a Plaintiff With creditor rights against the Defendant

By

identiﬁed in that case ﬁle.

statute,

Puckett must ﬁrst proceed against personalproperty interests

before pursuing real property interests (Bergmann successfully concealed various interests, While her
personal property interests in the divorce case had not been assigned).

Once requested
judgment

interests

to

proceed With execution, the sheriff examined the divorce case ﬁle, found

and levied upon

all

0f the interests Bergmann claimed and held within that

Fourth District Court divorce case ﬁle, entitled Smith

aware Bergmann

may attempt t0

v.

Smith,

Case No. CV-DR—1990-12684, being

conceal assets.

Puckett’s Letter t0 the sheriff provided, in part, the following:

“Enclosed with

this Letter

Court 0n October

8,

0f Instruction

is

the Writ of Execution issued by the Clerk of the Distn'ct

2014, authorizing you t0 execute upon property interests she owns, and at

present we request you execute upon the personal property interest she holds in that certain Judgment
entered in her favor in the case 0f Smith V. Smith,
all

CV-DR—90—12684D, 0n February

11,

199 1 and
,

subsequent modiﬁcations and renewals. That case was a divorce proceeding in which Sharon K.

Smith, the Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Vernon K. Smith, the Defendant. In that case,
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Sharon was awarded a money judgment, and in that proceeding she was referred t0 as "Smith", and

you will be executing upon that entirejudgment interest she holds in that case. She has been going
by her maiden name "Bergmann" since mid-ZOOO'S, and has recorded real property transfers in 2006
While using that name, though her social security number remains the same.” (Emphasis added) (R.
pp. 88; 194)

K

We request you commence execution upon any and all right, title, and interest 0f Sharon
Smith/Bergmann, (also known as Novotny/Moore/Bergmann) in that judgment entered in the case
entitled Sharon K. Smith V. Vernon K. Smith, case# CV—DR—1990-12684, originally ﬁled ofrecord
in the District Court ofthe Fourth Distn'ct ofthe State of Idaho, in and for Ada County, on or about
January 29, 1990, and judgment entered February 11, 1991. Mr. Puckett wants the property rights
and interests she holds in that judgment against Vernon K. Smith, and wants it levied upon, seized,
and sold at public auction, ...” (Emphasis added) (R. pp. 88; 194)
Nothing
writ against

in Puckett’s letter restricted the sheriff; the letter

and any and all right,

title,

speciﬁcally stating in the letter he
. . .

and interest 0fShar0n

was

asked the sheriff t0 execute the

K Smith/Bergmann

With Puckett

authorizing you t0 execute upon property interests she owns,

andyou will be executing upon that entirejudgment interest she holds in that case. That letter expressed

execution upon

all interests (entire judgment interest), all

the sheriffto levy upon everything in the ﬁle,

and the

references being expressed in the

sheriff conﬁlmjng nothjng

M,

was exempt,

wanting

selected

all

of

thejudgment interests contained in that divorce case ﬁle.

Every Sheriff Department Will assess the judgment creditor and request fees for
services, typically in advance,

their

depending upon the nature of the property they select to levy upon,

the extent 0f needed transport fees, storage costs, and security expenses incurred in relation t0 the

levy and subsequent

sale.

In this particular execution proceeding against the

determined there would be no transport, storage, or security

Bergmann’s

fees, as often

interests, the sheriff

involved With tangible

personal property interests such as equipment and vehicles.

The

sheriff,

once locating the classiﬁcation of property

exempt property of Bergmann, seizing
consistent With

I.

all

interests, levied

upon

the non-

property interests found in that divorce case ﬁle,

C. §1 1-201, wherein the statute provides the following:

moneys and other property, both
0f the judgment debtor, not exempt by law 0r by
court order, and allproperty and rights 0fpr0perty, seized and held under attachment in
the action, are liable t0 execution. Shares and interest in any corporation 0r company, and
11-201. Property liable t0 seizure. All goods, chattels,

real

and personal, 0r any

debts

interest therein

and credits, and all other property both real andpersonal, 0r any interest in either
and all other property not capable ofmanual delivery, may be

real or personal property,

attached 0n execution in like manner as upon writs of attachment. Gold dust must be
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returned by the ofﬁcer as so

same

the

The
in the letter,

much money

collected, at

t0 sale. Until a levy, property is not affected

Sheriff, after locating the divorce case ﬁle,

saw the

its

by the

and two Orders amending Judgments, other order and another judgment, and a

201. Each Instrument related t0 a “judgment” interest,
case ﬁle, With the
interests

The
to others,

Sheriff” s

named parties

sheriff was

and

levy,

made aware 0f debtor’s

set forth the plural

the Writ 0f Execution and Notice 0f Levy
(R. p. 42) With sale

that divorce case ﬁle, scheduled to sell

in her Brief, has

“The

“Judgment” on November

13,

20

the ﬁle, With the Notice 0f

Levy all property interests in the case

0n October 23, 2014,

Levy and

ﬁle, recording

(R. pp. 43 -44), posting notice

of sale

of allproperty interests claimed and held by Bergmann in
13, 2014.

chosen to misrepresent t0

14.”.

and none

reference with respect t0 the property interests the

0n November

Sheriffs Return

C. §1 1-

of Which stemmed from that old divorce

“Sheriff” s Return”, a further effort to misconstrue the facts.
states:

I.

of

propensity t0 conceal interests, or assign interests

all interests in

sherifflevied upon, stating within the Notice of

Bergmann,

subj ect t0 levy under

series

were claimed t0 be owned by the debtor.

all

and thus the reason for taking

0n October 29, 2014

all

all

as identiﬁed in the letter, consistent with the ﬁle contents,

were exempt from

Return expressly

Bergmann

execution. (Emphasis added).

original 1991 judgment, as referenced

renewals reﬂecting reference t0 “Judgment” interests 0f the debtor,

of the

current value, without exposing

0n Writ 0f Execution

The

this court

On

p. 8

what

is

stated in the

0f Respondent’s Brief,

sets out the results

0f the sale of the

Sheriff’s Return speciﬁcally states:

Ireceived the Writ of Execution 0n October

9, 2014, and pursuant t0 said Writ and
on October 23, 2014, I served a copy thereof with Notice 0f
Levy upon the Ada County Recorder through Gail Garrett, 200 W. Front St., Boise, ID
83702, by recording said documents as Instrument No. 2014-086335 and Instrument No.
2014-086336, and did levy upon thepersonalproperty interests presently claimed by said
Sharon K. Smith, as judgment creditor, she holds wherein she is identified and named as
the Plaintiff therein, and her former husband, Vernon K. Smith, is named and identiﬁed
as the Defendant therein, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684 and that I Noticed the property for
Sheriff’s Sale scheduled 0n November 13, 2014.
That pursuant t0 Instructions from said Plaintiff on October 23, 2014, I did also
2.)
serve a copy of those recorded documents upon the Ada County Fourth District Court,
through Chelsea Caratinni, Deputy Clerk at 200 W. Front St, Boise, ID 83702.
That copies of the attached recorded documents, with Claim of Exemption form
3.)
were mailed to the Defendant on October 24, 2014, at the following address: Sharon K.
Smith, 13724 Morning Side St., Nampa, ID, 8365 1-5091.
That 0n November 6, 2014, Sheriff Sale Notices were posted at the following
4.)
locations: Public Safety Building lobby at 7200 Barrister Dr., Boise, ID 83704; Albertson's
lobby at 1520 Cole Rd. Boise, ID 83704; and Fred Meyer's lobby at 5230 W. Franklin Rd.,
1.)

Instructions

from

Plaintiff
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ID 83705.

Boise,

That I attended at the time and place of said Sale and sold the previously described
5.)
personal property and rendered the following statement to wit: Judgment amount
$173,226.70, interest 0n Judgment from October 1, 2014 through November 13, 2014,
$2,068.19, Sheriff’s fees: (services, return, postings, commission, mailings, and certiﬁcate
0f sale) $187.17, recording fees: Certiﬁcate 0f Sale: $10.00, Sheriffs costs and fees:
$197.17, less amount credit bid by Plaintiff: $100.00, amount still owed 0n Judgment:
$175,392.06. (Emphasis added)

The

Sheriff” s

Return speciﬁcally described he levied upon allpropertfy interests, expressly

stating:

“1

.).

.

..

,

and did levy upon

the personalproperty interests [plural] presently claimed by
is identiﬁed and named

said Sharon K. Smith, as judgment creditor, she holds wherein she

and her former husband, Vernon K. Smith, is named and identiﬁed
Defendant therein, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684 and that I Noticed the property for
Sheriff’s Sale scheduled 0n November 13, 2014.” (Emphasis added)

as the Plaintiff therein,
as the

That “levy” was upon

“personal property interests” ...claimed

Vernon K. Smith

and

as the Plaintiff therein,

all

CV-DR-1990-12684 and noticed

is

named

...as the

...Sheriffs Sale scheduled

she holds.

..

named

Defendant therein, Case No.

0n November

13, 2014.

There has never been reference t0 any single levied upon “Judgment”, as Bergmann
misrepresents on p.

nor

8,

is

there any reference t0 a speciﬁc 0r certain

again misstates 0n p. 4 of Respondent’s Brief, Where

“On November
0n November

That

is

14, 2014, appellant assigned the

but

13,

not what Puckett assigned.

all

sold at the Sheriff’s sale
last line 0f that

the Record, p.

page)”

222 and read

that

It states:

exact same investment Mr. Puckett had paid,

and sheriff fees, When he assigned, transferred and conveyed all 0fthe
he had acquired at the sale t0 Vernon K. Smith 0n
2014. (Emphasis added)

costs

saidjudgment

November

“Judgment”

When you examine

we d0 know the re-sale value was the

including

misrepresents:

2014 t0 his attorney Vernon K. Smith. (R. 222,

paragraph, including the “last line 0f that page”.
....,

Bergmann

“Judgment” as Bergmann

17,

creditor’s interests

Bergmann and her

attorney realize neither the case law nor the statutes support any 0f

Bergmann’s “subj ective preference” 0r descriptive

The lower court

limitations in

itself realized the sheriff levied

upon

all

what was sold
property interests in that divorce

case ﬁle, never selling any “one judgment interest”, but all personal properly interests claimed

and held by Bergmann in
sheriff did that t0 avoid

that identiﬁed

and described divorce case ﬁle as one unit

sale,

and the

any conﬂict among the various instruments (judgments, modiﬁcations,
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amendments, renewals,

announcement

The

etc.).

sheriff

made

at the sale, as disclosed in the Sheriff’s

If Bergmann

had a personal preference

and during the

that apparent in the advertisement

t0 sell

Notice 0f Levy and Sheriffs Return.

any of these instruments in that divorce case

ﬁle separately, she needed to attend the sale and direct the sheriff to that effect.

The lower court cannot modify

the statutory language t0 suit

the subjective preference 0f the debtor, and there

is

no

its

“subj ective preference” 0r

factual basis to suggest these interests (the

lower court saw two judgments among the series 0f instruments) would be sold to any advantage
separately as opposed to one unit sale, and notwithstanding, that
to direct the

manner of

sale, as that is

is

not the right of the lower court

within the vested authority and prerogative 0f the sheriff,

subj ect t0 the directive of the debtor, if in attendance at the sale.

There

is

no

factual presentation in this record that

generate a sale price to

some

better advantage,

and

any instrument sold separately would

irrespective, there has

been n0 “established

standard” cited by the lower court to alter the sheriff” s prerogative to conduct the sale in the

he

did.

The

sheriff is vested with authority to conduct the sale as

manner

he deems appropriate, subject t0

the presence and direction 0f the debtor.

By

statute, the established,

long-standing “standard” as t0

who

sale is that the sheriff has the sole prerogative, absent the attendance

directs the

and any

manner 0f the

direction from the

debtor at the sale, and the sheriff’s prerogative remains supreme as the controlling authority and
right to select the

manner 0f sale 0f the personal property

articles,

absent the attendance and any

directionfrom the debtor at the sale, and given the divorce case ﬁle contents and the nature 0f the
interests
all

and the

series

of renewals, concerns about the validity of renewals and the enforceability,

of Which related to the subj ect matter derived from a divorce proceeding, a one unit-one

sale

method was

selected, consistent With the authority

the absence of any direction

court and

Bergmann

The

and prerogative 0f the

from the debtor, as she declined

are ignoring

controlling statutory authority

is

sheriff, as there

to attend the sale.

what was advertised and announced

money
was

Both the lower

at the sale.

vested in the sheriff through Title 11, Idaho Code,

Within Which there are the provisions contained Within

I.

C. §§ 1 1-201, 301, 302, and 304,

addressing the manner in Which the sheriff will execute the writ, levy upon non-exempt personal
property, provide notice, claim forms, advertise and conduct the sale.

The

pertinent excerpts taken from these statutes are set forth as follows:
I.

C. §1 1-201 provides:
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A11 goods, chattels,
therein of the

moneys and

other property, both real and personal, 0r any interest

judgment debtor, not exempt by law 0r by court

order,

and

property and

all

0f property, seized and held under attachment in the action, are liable t0 execution.
and debts and credits, and all other property both real and personal, or any interest in

rights

either real 0r personal property,

be attached 0n execution.
I.

.

.as

and

upon

all

other property not capable of manual delivery,

writs 0f attachment.

may

..

C. §1 1-301 provides:

The sheriff must execute the writ against the property 0f the judgment debtor by levying
0n a sufﬁcient amount of property if there be sufﬁcient; collecting or selling the things in
action,

and

selling the other property,

and paying

the proceeds as Will satisfy the judgment.

debtor than
sheriff,
if the

I.

is

......

t0 the plaintiff or his attorney so

much of

When there is more property ofthe judgment

sufﬁcient t0 satisfy the judgment and accruing costs Within the View 0f the

he must levy only 0n such part 0f the property as the judgment debtor may indicate,

property indicated be amply sufﬁcient to satisfy the judgment and costs.

C. §1 1-302 provides:

Before the sale 0f the property 0n execution, notice thereof must be given as follows:
2. In

case of other personal property,

in the precinct 0r city

Where the

by posting a

sale is t0 take place for not less than

ten (10) days before the time set for the sale, or
(1)

week, and not more than two

be one.

I.

similar notice in three (3) public places

ﬁve

(5)

nor more than

by publishing a copy thereof at

least

(2) weeks, in a newspaper published in the county,

one

if there

.....

C. §1 1-304 provides:

A11 sales 0f property under execution must be

....When the sale

is

made

0f personal property, capable 0f manual delivery,

such parcels as are likely t0 bring the highest price;
at the sale,

may also

at auction, to the highest bidder.

direct the order in

such property consists 0f several

......

which property,

known

it

The judgment

must be sold

real 0r personal, shall

lots or parcels, or

in

debtor, if present

be

sold,

when

0f articles which can be sold

t0

advantage separately, and the sheriff must follow such directions.

Bergmann’s property

interests,

were not physically capable 0f manual delivery, as those

Instruments identifying those interests were in a divorce case ﬁle in the

Ada County

courthouse,

Fourth District, and not to be removed from the Courthouse. Thus, the reason the Notice 0f Levy

and Writ 0f Execution were recorded,

to give speciﬁc public notice

of the location 0f the ﬁle,

containing speciﬁc reference t0 the case name, case ﬁle number, district court, and nature of the

property interests.

These statutory provisions proscribe a requirement
be sold

at the sheriff’s sale in separate interests, rather
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if

a debtor wants personal property t0

than as a single unit or single

lot sale,

it is

incumbent upon the debtor
debtor believes that

it

t0

be at the scheduled sale and direct the sheriff in what manner

would be

in debtor’s best interest t0 sell the property in individual lots

rather than a single unit lotfor one money.

The process of this

“single unit” sale

the sheriff in Safaris Unlimited, supra,
lot for

not

were the

uncommon, and was
and

rights, titles,

the

interests

method

direction, 0r instruction

right, title, or interest as

was given

a separate item.

t0 the sheriff

The

from the debtor

interests in the Safaris

selected

by

were sold as one unit

one sum of money. In both of these instances, the debtor declined to appear

no objection,
item,

is

at the sale

to sell

any

and

article,

Unlimited case were

also contained in a single case ﬁle, then in pending litigation.

These execution

statutes,

and the authority vested within them, are the controlling

“standard” under the law. Both the lower court, as well as an appellate court, id bound t0 enforce
their statutory provisions,

Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,

and not seek

t0 re-write them. In

207 P.3d 988 (2009),

Wheeler

v.

Idaho Dept. ofHealth and

this court stated:

When engaging in

statutorv construction, this Court has a "dutv t0 ascertain the
"
"
legislative intent, andgive effect t0 that intent. Id. [Tlhe Court must construe a statute

as a whole,
intent

and consider

0f the

legislature.

"

all sections

statutes together t0 determine the

0f applicable

Davaz, 125 Idaho

at

336, 870 P.2d at 1295 (internal citation

"

[The Court] also must take account 0f all other matters such as the
reasonableness 0f the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statute." Id.”
omitted).

(Emphasis added).

The general

Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016),

“The objective 0f

was

summarized also

in Hoﬁ’er

v.

t0 give effect t0 legislative intent.” State

v.

rules 0f statutory interpretation

also

stating:

statutory interpretation

is

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 47 1, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007).

“When interpreting

a statute,

.” Williams v. Blue Cross
words 0f the statute.
ofldaho,
“If
151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (201 1).
the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect.
.” Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada
Cnly. Bd. oquualization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335
P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting St. Luke’s Reg’ l Med. Ctr.,
Ltd. v. Bd. ofComm ’rs ofAda Cnly., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This
Court does not have the authority t0 modify an unambiguous legislative enactment.
Verska v. SaintAlphonsus Reg’ lMed. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (201 1)
(quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962)). 160 Idaho at
884, 380 P.3d at 695. (Emphasis added).

the Court begins with the literal

.

.

.

Additionally, the long-standing authority

below supports the established doctrine

debtor waives any challenge t0 the manner 0f sale, and
selection

and prerogative

in the

manner of sale,
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is

estopped from challenging the

.

that a

sheriff” s

if the debtorfails t0 attend the sale. There

is

n0

defect arising from the selection of the

any subjective preference

to direct the sheriff as to

sale process, as long as the sale is

The language
the selected

in

to

some

the debtor fails t0 appear at the sale

alternative

method

in conducting the

performed in accordance with the statutory requirements.

C. §1 1-304 declares the formation of this statutory waiver to challenge

I.

manner by which

debtor’s right t0 direct the

and when the debtor

manner 0f sale when

the personal property interests have been are sold, declaring the

manner 0f sale

contingent upon the debtor’s attendance at the sale,

is

fails to attend, object,

0r direct the sheriff as t0 a preferred

physical sale of the articles/interests being sold at that sale, the challenge

manner 0f the

effectively

is

waived by

statute.

This statute has been declared t0 operate in accordance with the doctrine of estoppel, the
intended effect of which

A debtor’s

is

t0 protect the ﬁnality

of the

absence was addressed in Fed.

sale.

Land Bank ofSpokane

v.

Curts, 45 Idaho 414,

425, 262 P. 877, 880 (1927), Where the long standing axiom over the debtor’s absence from the
sale cannot preserve a challenge the sheriff failed to separate the rights 0r interests being sold,

where the

articles/interests

were sold as one unit

lot.

A debtor’s absence, and the failure t0 object, 0r direct the sheriff constitutes a waiver, and
estopped to complain the process was defective 0r ineffective in Coghlan
613, 212 P. 867 (1923) Where the property (being real)

and also Quirk v Bedal, 42, Idaho 567, 248

P.

v.

City ofBoise, 36 Idaho

was sold in gross and not

447 (1926), where the property

in individual lots,

(also real)

was sold

while the debtor was present, but failed to obj ect, and the court imposed the doctrine ofestoppel.
In Coghlan

,

supra, the principle

was expressed

in the following manner:

“A judgment debtor, being present at an execution sale ofreal property, With the right under
the statute to direct the order in which such property shall be sold, who makes no request
of the ofﬁcer as to the order in Which he desires the property
heard t0 complain that it was sold en masse, .....”

sold,

cannot thereafter be

“As

the rule requiring a sale in parcels is intended for the beneﬁt 0f execution defendant,
compliance with it may be waived by him, and such waiver may be implied from his
acquiescence in the sale orfrom his delay in objecting thereto. (23 C. J. 635, sec. 591;
Hudepohl v. Liberty Hill Water etc. C0., supra.)”

By

being present

at the sale

and

failing to

irregularity in selling en masse. (O'Bryan

make any
v.

objection, defendant waives

any

Davis, 103 Ala. 429, 15 So. 860.) (A11

emphasis added).
In Quirk v Bedal, supra, the court applied the doctrine of estoppel, as the debtor neither
instructed nor objected, stating:
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"Under our well-settled jurisprudence, where one stands by and sees his property
sold under legal process, without making his claim known, or objecting thereto, he will be
bound by the sale; ...” (Emphasis added)
In Fed. Land Bank ofSpokane v. Curts, supra, a presumption was also established in favor
of the

sheriff:

“There

is

a presumption that an ofﬁcer making a judicial sale did his duty. (Leppel

38 C010. 292, 88 P. 448; Porter
This sheriffs sale

is

v.

v.

Kus,

Pico, 55 Cal. 165.)”

entitled t0 the doctrine

of waiver, doctrine 0f estoppel, and the

application 0f the “doctrine and presumption 0f regularity”, as these ofﬁcial proceedings were

conducted by a

and a “presumption 0f regularity”

sheriff,

County ofﬁces. State

v.

exists in the

performance of duties 0f

Bever, 118 Idaho 80, 83, 794 P.2d 1136, 1139, (1990) and

Homer

v.

Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985).
Within the legislative enactment of

C. §1 1-304, the Legislative intent

I.

authority in the sheriff t0 sell property, within his prerogative and as he

only to any limitation therein, and with personal property,

engage in attempting to

sell as

separate articles that

may sell

may not,

deems

was

to vest

appropriate, subj ect

in a single unit sale rather than

in his prerogative

and opinion,

may

not be susceptible t0 a better advantage 0f a separate sale, where the potential of conﬂict or overlap

within 0r

among

the property interests, being creditor rights that

were decades

01d,

With renewals

revealing no amounts, uncertainty 0f a renewal sequence and whether an instrument
0r preserved, but claimed and held
that

from

origination, has laid

its

The

statute,

by one party

in

one divorce proceeding in one divorce case ﬁle

dormant for decades.

C. §1 1-304, allows a debtor t0 take part in the process, should the debtor

I.

manner 0f sale, and

attend the sale, and elect t0 direct the sheriff in a preferred

and

direct the sheriff,

no challenge

t0 the use

of a single unit sale 0f the

and by established law, deemed waived and debtor estopped

A number 0f cases cite t0
recognized by

statute, requires a

I.

C. §1 1-304 that

declared.

is

sale.

The

t0

conﬁrm

debtor t0 be present

manner, sequence, and conduct 0f the
the debtor

was replaced

interests Will

be preserved,

complain about the manner 0f sale.

this

process 0f

at the sale, if

sale.

The “standard”,

a debtor desires t0 direct the

statute expressly establishes that obligation,

charged with knowledge of that requirement, as the authority

The debtor’s

failing to attend

failure t0 attend the sale has terminal consequences.

cite

N0

and

hereinbefore so

case has

modiﬁed

0r eliminated this consequential effect of imposing a waiver and estoppel doctrines against a debtor
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who

fails to

be present

consequence of such
In

at the sale t0 direct the sheriff,

failure to attend, as required

Nez Perce Tribe

v.

Little

by

and there

is

n0 challenge preserved

as a

statute.

Hope Investments,

L.L.C., 140 Idaho 21991 P.3d 1123 (2004),

the court, While referring to another statute, held:
‘6
.

Following

.....

this line

0f reasoning, an objection

0f the judicial order of foreclosure Via

after entry

may be raised at the time

post-trial

0fsale 0r

motions or appeal.

None 0f

these options were exercised in this case. Because the sheriﬁf conducted the sale 0f the

property consistent with the court order without objection at the time 0fthe sheriffs sale,
the causes 0f action against Nez Perce County and its sheriff are dismissed also.”

(Emphasis added).
In

Suchan

v.

Suchan, 113 Idaho 102,741 P.2d 1289 (1986), the court held:

“In general, parcels not adaptedfor separate and distin ct enjoyment should be sold as a
unit. However, under I.C. §1 1-304 ifthe party directing the order ofsale can show in an
intelligible

manner

the particular

way in which the property can be proﬁtably sold in
and the sherﬁmustfollow his directions. Gaskill,

parcels, the general rule will not apply

77 Idaho

at

In Ketterer

432, 292 P.2d at 960.” (Emphasis added)
v.

Billings,

106 Idaho 832, 683 P.2d 868 (1984), the court held:

“Furthermore, LC. §1 1-304, the section which describes the manner in which an
execution sale is t0 be conducted, simply states that "[alll sales 0f property under

execution must be made at auction, t0 the highest bidder, between the hours 0f nine (9:00)
in the morning and ﬁve (5:00) in the afternoon." LC. §1 1-304 places n0 other restrictions

0n the time when an execution

sale

may be

conducted. Appellant has not contended that

the execution sale herein violated I.C. §11-304 in any manner. Therefore,
set aside the

execution sale 0n the ground that the sale took place 0n

we

November

refuse t0

11, 1976.”

(Emphasis added).
In

Farm

Credit

Bank ofSpokane

v.

Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994), the

court held:

The judgment

debtor, ifpresent at the sale,

property, real 0r personal, shall be sold
I.C. §11-304.

We

note

and

may

also direct the order in which the

the sheriff mustfollow such directions.

initially that, "[ijn general,

parcels not adaptedfor separate use

and distinct enjoyment should be sold as a unit." Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 109,
741 P.2d 1289, 1296 (1987) .... The record below discloses n0 reason theproperty should
not be sold as one parcel. There is n0 basis upon which this Court could conclude that
selling the land as one parcel was not a reasonable means ofselling the landproﬁtably.
Suchan, 113 Idaho

at 110,

In Safaris Unlimited,

“Title
sales.

LLC,

741 P.2d
v.

at

1297. (Emphasis added)

Von Jones, 421 P.3d 205 (2018), the court

held:

11 0f the Idaho Code enumerates the particular requirements governing sheriff
...For example, Title 11 permits the judgment creditor t0 execute 0n all non-exempt

. .
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personal and real property 0f the judgment debtor, I.C. §11-201,

.....,

articulates strict

conduct-of—sale requirements, LC. § 11-304,
The "general rule" that governs Whether
a sheriff’s sale should be vacated is as follows: "mere inadequacy 0f consideration is not

sufﬁcient ground for setting aside a sheriff’s sale, but

it

is

uniformly held that gross

inadequacy of consideration, coupled with very slight additional circumstances,
sufﬁcient."

.

.

..

Applying

is

the general rule here leads us t0 vacate the district court’s decision

setting aside the sheriff sale.

.

..

we

reach this result because the

district

courtfailed t0 act

consistently with relevant standards by not conducting a proper application 0f the
governing law. The district court speciﬁcally failed to make a sufﬁcient ﬁnding as to the

approximate value 0f the Sligar

litigation.

.....

Because the

district court failed to

make

a

sufﬁcient ﬁnding here, and thus failed t0 act consistently with relevant legal standards,

we vacate the district court’s decision

setting aside the sheriffsale and

proceedings consistent With this opinion. See,

e.g.,

Rish

702, 706, 390 P.3d 428, 432 (2017) ("Therefore,

v.

we

remand

Home Depot,

for further

Ina, 161 Idaho

vacate and remand for proper

...."); Urry v. Walker & Fox Masonry Contractors, 115
Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989) ("[I]f a decision, taken as a Whole, appears to
reﬂect a misapprehension 0f law, the proper appellate response is t0 vacate the decision

application 0f the governing law

and

t0

remand

the case for reconsideration in light 0f the proper legal framework").

(Emphasis added).
In Fulton

Duro, 108 Idaho 392, 700 P.2d 14 (1985), the court held:

v.

“Moreover, the judgment debtor

aﬂorded the

is

right, ifpresent at the sale, to "direct the

order in which property, real or personal, shall be sold,

when such

property consists of

several known lots 0r parcels, 0r of articles which can be sold to advantage separately,
and the sheriff must follow such directions." I.C. § 11-304.” (Emphasis added).

In Nixon

Triber, 100 Idaho 198,595 P.2d 1093 (1979), while referring to another statute,

v.

the court held:

“In each of these cases, an execution sale

conduct 0f the

was

Further, the speciﬁc statute

n0 operation as t0 the
(Emphasis added).

“The

v.

sale

which

is

is

void

if notice

of the sale

is

defective.

controlling in the case at bar, LC. §1 1-303, clearly has

irregularities

complained 0f in

Gaskill, Joy,

and

Terry, supra.”

Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957 (1956), the court held:

was not conducted

Mortgages,

because 0f irregularities in the

not because notice of the sale was defective. ....N0ne 0f these cases

sale,

stand for the proposition that an execution sale

In Gaskill

set aside

in

sec. 627, pp. 94-95.

before the property

is

compliance with LC. §11-304. See also 37 Am.Jur.,
the right to withdraw his bid at any time

A bidder has

knocked down

t0 him,

and the sheriff has n0 authority

t0 prescribe

conditions which deprive the bidder of this right. 33 C.J.S., Executions, § 214, p. 461
In Joy Mfg. C0.

v.

R. S.

.”

McClintock Diamond Drilling Co.,77 Idaho 309, 291 P.2d 874

(1955), the court held:
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“Section 11-304,
provides:

I.C.,

governing the conduct 0f sales 0n execution, among other things

Thejudgment debtor, ifpresent at the sale, may also direct the order in
real 0r personal, shall be sold, when such properly consists 0f several
orparcels, 0r ofarticles which can be sold t0 advantage separately, and the

........

which properly,

known

lots

sheriffmustfollow such directions.

'”

(Emphasis added).

The recent case involving personal property

interests sold at a sheriff’s sale,

where the

debtor was absent, and the property interests (claims, cause 0f actions) were sold as advertised as
a single unit,

is

Safaris Unlimited v. Jones, Docket NO. 44914, 163 Idaho 874, 421 P.3d 205 (2018).

The court never proceeded

t0 address the”

sale

was reversed and remanded t0 address

sale

of the

rights, titles,

and identiﬁed

in a

and

conduct of

the issue of valuation.

interests pertaining t0 claims

pending

sale”, as the order setting aside the

litigation case ﬁle,

The

sale resulted in a single unit

and causes 0f actions of a debtor found

Where the

sheriff sold all 0f the interests 0f the

debtor in that pending litigation, utilizing the single unit sale concept, given the nature 0f the
interests

being sold t0 the bidding public. The debtor in Safaris failed to attend the

sale, as

did

Bergmann.
If for

any reason Bergmann claims

t0

have harbored any misunderstanding, confusion, 0r

concern as t0 the Sheriff’s election t0 combine Whatever those interests were as a single unit as t0

what she held and claimed in that case
statutory obligation to

be

ﬁle,

at the sale, as

Smith v Smith, Case No. CV-DR—1990-12684, she had the

Bergmann knew

that all

0f her “property interests” were

referenced in a series 0f documents, and knew, from the notiﬁcation to her from the sheriff, and the
notiﬁcation she received from her attorney, that

all

property interests were levied upon, and were

scheduled t0 be sold.
If Bergmann

she had an attorney

had any doubt as t0 her rights 0r in what manner she could express her concerns,

Who was

fully

aware 0f the execution, as her attorney mailed copies of the

execution and notice documents t0 her, as Puckett had mailed

Bergmann expressed n0
waived any objection

t0

entitlement,

of those

who

of those same items to her attorney.

obj ection t0 the Sheriff s prerogatives in conducting the sale,

which she before had a

failure to attend resulted in a

to the sale

all

statutory right, pursuant t0

I.

C. §1 1-304, and that

waiver t0 challenge the sale method, and Bergmann

interests

found Within the case ﬁle, pursuant

is

estopped to obj ect

t0 the sheriff’s prerogative

sold the interests as a single unit at the scheduled sale.
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and Bergmann

and

As noted

Suchan

in

vs.

Suchan

(1

13 Idaho 102, 109, 741P.2d 1289, 1296 (1986)

any

misunderstanding ofaparties legal rights, though unfortunate, does not constitute any irregularity
in the process 0fthe Sheriff’s Sale.

On

p.

9 0f Respondent’s Brief,

Bergmann has chosen

to

“emphasize” the commentary

within the lower court’s denial 0f Puckett’s reconsider request, citing an excerpt 0fthe lower court:
“Several years after the Court’s decision was issued, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an

opinion t0 the effect
sheriffs sale,

Unlimited,

it

that,

When

a district court relies 0n price inadequacy in setting aside a

must make a factual ﬁnding

LLC v.

as to the value of the property sold.” Safaris

Jones, 163 Idaho 874, 886, 421 P.3d 205, 217 (2018).

“As a general matter, that’s a reasonable requirement. Here, however, n0 such ﬁnding
should be required (and none is being made). As already explained, Smith’s judgment
debt increased because 0f the sheriff’s sale, as the winning bid was smaller than the
sheriffs tees, Which are added to the judgment debt. This anomalous outcome
th_e
iudgment debtor owing even more monev after the sheriffs sale —iustiﬁes a ﬁnding that
the sale price was grossly inadequate as a matter oflaw, n0 matter what the property sold

—

is

worth. That property couldn’t possibly have been worth less than nothing, yet less than

nothing

is

what Smith received

for

Any way you

it.

slice

it,

that’s gross inadequacy.” (R.

825, footnote 1) (A11 italicized emphasis added)

That

is

rather “rich”

commentary, but

at the

very

concluded t0 be the “subjectivity” 0f the lower court

all

least,

serves to support

along. This

what Puckett has

commentary serves

to take

an

exception t0 the “standard” that appears to have been announced, as this court requires a ﬁnding

of valuation, as stated in Safaris Unlimited, supra, (must
expressed by the lower court

by

is

make a

factual finding).

What

is

being

another example 0f the lower court’s “subjectivity”, not supported

established case law 0r long-standing interpretations of statutory authority pertaining t0

execution statutes, but in disregard to

it.

It is

this “subj activity” that underlies the

abuse 0f

discretion exhibited throughout this controversy.
It is

not a principle of law that

after the sherijfs sale

—[that]

when

justifies

“the judgment debtor

is

owing even more money

aﬁnding that the sale price was grossly inadequate as a

matter oflaw, n0 matter what the property sold

That “subjective” proposition

[is]

is

worth ”.

not an established “principle of law” or an “applicable

standard” to be used in sheriff sale challenges, and from Where the lower court
in saying “as a matter

0f law”, n0 matter what the property sold

is

would ﬁnd credence

worth”, that has gone beyond

an abuse 0f discretion.

None 0f this

“subj activity” 0r “subj ective preferences” 0f the lower court or
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Bergmann

are

supported by statute, any interpretation 0f a statute, or expressed in any case law. This
series

is

just a

of subjective illusions emanating from both the lower court and Bergmann.

What

is

now

apparent from the unabashed subjective expressions of the lower court and

promoted by Bergmann

is that this

“subj activity”

been the basis for the lower court to

is

the underlying reasoning and rationale that has

This lower court has n0

set aside this lawful sheriff’s sale.

applied any “relevant legal standards”, but rather a “subjective preference” as t0 the manner in
selling articles/instruments at a sheriff’s sale,

and simply

stated, the

statutorily vested prerogative a sheriff has in these matters, in the

and a court cannot override

this entitlement

The lower court has emphasized
embrace what was announced
used by the lower court in

its

absence of the debtor

vested with the sheriff,

its

subjectivity

when

by taking

in Safaris, instead “doubling

lower court has ignored the
at the sale,

a debtor fails t0 appear.

the occasion to decline to

down” 0n

the “subjective analysis”

disillusionment as t0 the consequential effects 0f these “statutorily

assessed sheriff fees”, as the lower court has subjectively injected the “sheriff’s fees” into the
effects

0f the sale process, solely upon which

inadequacy” 0f the sale price,

when nowhere

this court

in the

has based

law do

its

we ﬁnd

opinion for “gross

the required statutory

assessment of fees and costs to play a role in deﬁning the “sale price” under any principle 0r
standard of the law.
It is

readily apparent the lower court

is

distressed and concerned over the “assessment

process”, but neither the lower court, a judgment creditor, nor a judgment debtor has any control

over these statutorily imposed assessments.
the debtor

must

suffer the inclusion t0 the

A judgment creditor must suffer the advance cost, and

judgment deﬁciency, done

as a matter 0f law.

The lower court was ﬁxated and passionate regarding this unfortunate consequence 0fthese
unavoidable costs of execution, but like death and taxes, you cannot escape their imposition, but
certainly these assessments

and costs are not to be incorporated

into the analysis

0f the “sale price”

or “sale process”.

The assessment
t0 satisfy costs

inadequate”

is

unavoidable, and no surprise that sales often generate proceeds that

fail

0f execution, and When those events occur, that does not compute t0 a “grossly

sale, “as

a matter 0f law”. Neither the lower court nor

established standard in the law, as

execution costs can, at times,

it

would be unreasonable

Bergmann can

cite

any such

t0 structure such a standard, as these

include substantial transportation costs, exorbitant storage costs,

expensive security and protection services, as the sheriff is liable for security as in other bailment
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and the consequential

situations,

these

come

effects could

to involve thousands

more complex execution proceedings, and these

the sale price, 0r if there

is

pay the debt and avoid the

Where
analysis as

a sale at

all,

which

is

costs

and fees must be paid, regardless of

uncommon

not

0f dollars expended in

either,

When

the debtor wants t0

sale.

the “standard” 0r “principle” in law t0 serve t0 “consecrate” this “subjective

is

becoming “a matter 0f law”? This

court, yet is nothing

subjectivity that has

more than unchartered methodology imagined

caused substantial disruption to the enforcement of the execution

been proffered by the lower
to support

ﬂawed

and

logic,

statutes.

This Court has never embraced such methodology in these execution statutes, and neither
the lower court nor

Bergmann can provide precedents

t0 support this subj ective

T0 avoid the consequence 0fthe concern 0f the lower court,
a

“minimum bid”

bid,

What

is

at the

announced

sale t0 cover “costs

the standard to determine

approve such a proposition?

what

that bid

Who establishes the

a sheriffwould have t0 impose

0f execution”. If there

amount

methodology.

Will be?

Would

is

t0

be a minimum

the Legislature ever

“standard” and What “reasoning applies?

This rather subjective, unorthodox and unconventional approach t0 valuations, pricing, and
prerogatives that can be exercised at a sheriff’s sale, conditioned

and

costs, is unacceptable,

and subjective preferences
any rationale

and

it

remains t0 be recognized that

that underlies the

legal reasoning,

this

fees

unconventional “standard”

lower court’s discretionary abuse, and cannot support

to set aside a sheriff” s sale that has

This subjectivity of the lower court

it is

upon recovery of assessed

is

been conducted under the

facts within this record.

void 0f any precedents, standards, 0r established

and remains inconceivable a sheriff

sale

would become exposed

t0 invalidation

because a judge wants to condition the validity 0f the sale upon satisfaction of “sheriff fees” and
assessed processing costs, and wants to

tell

the sheriff

how

t0 exercise his statutorily vested

prerogative in conducting the sale, in the absence 0f the debtor.

The lower

court’s reasoning 0f “price

adequacy”

is

emphasized in these excerpts of

its

ﬁndings, concluding the sale failed t0 cover processing costs, and for n0 other reason, has become
the epitome 0f “gross inadequacy”, regardless 0f property value, With the following
starting

With the lower court’s analysis in

But

it

its

February

did not yield a sizeable bid. Instead,

it

6,

2014 Order,

initially

ﬂawed

logic,

concluding:

yielded a credit bid in an amount too small t0

even cover the sheriff’sfees, Which are added t0 the judgment debt, causing the total judgment
debt t0 increase, rather than decrease, as a result 0f the sale 0f Sharon Smith’s rights.
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..

Thus,

she received less than nothing through the sheriffs sale in return for those rights. (Memo.
Decision Pg. 6) (R. pp. 471; 568; 626) (Emphasis added).

The lower court became yet more devoted
Order,
idea

when

re-Visiting this

2019

to the subjective analysis in the April 12,

unorthodox analysis, and with more audacity, expanded the subj ective

by emphasizing:
“As a general matter [ﬁnding an approximate valuation], that’s a reasonable requirement.
Here, however, n0 such ﬁnding should be required (and none is being made). As already
explained, Smith’s judgment debt increased because of the sheriff s sale, as the winning bid
was smaller than the sheriff’s fees, which are added to the judgment debt. This anomalous
thejudgment debtor owing even more money after the sheriffs sale —justiﬁesoutcome
a ﬁnding that the sale price was grossly inadequate as a matter ot law, n0 matter what the

—

property sold is worth. That property couldn’t possibly have been worth

less than nothing, yet

what Smith received for it. Any way you slice it, that’s gross inadequacy.”
825, footnote 1) (Italics and second underlying emphasis added).

less than nothing is

(R.

Neither in 2014 nor 2019 does the lower court provide any case law, a principle, a standard
0r the “governing law” to support these subjective preferences, regarding gross inadequacy, yet
the lower court
controlling,

would express the proposition

“no matter what the property sold

that this is “a matter
is

0f law”, and

is

claimed to be

worth”.

This “preference”, this treatment 0f the “costs 0f execution”, and this determination “gross

inadequacy” of a sale price, “as a matter of law”, occurs

when the

sale price fails t0 cover costs

execution, together with the lower court’s personal preference t0 control the

by

statute, left t0 the prerogative

manner 0f sale

and selection 0f the sheriff (absent the debtor’s presence)

that is
is

underlying theme behind the abuse 0f discretion 0f the lower court’s Order setting aside the

There

is

n0 “standard” or authority

preferences are

t0 support

it;

phantom concepts, about Which

Bergmann cannot produce
this appellate court

it,

of

the

sale.

as these subjective

must conﬁrm d0 not

exist in

the law.

Though the lower
consume
and

court appears t0 be “shocked”

the funds generated at a sale,

that “standard” has

no

been established

by this

reality sheriff sales

can and often do

analysis 0f “value” 0f property can be inferred

in Phillips

v.

from

that,

Blazier—Hemy, 154 Idaho 724, 729, 302 P.3d

349, 354 (2013) wherein the court rejected these “shocking” attributes, disregarding any "shock the

conscience" considerations emanating from a sheriff s sale, also rejecting as irrelevant concepts that
result

from a parties’ inattention and misunderstanding 0fthe law, as

“additional circumstance” t0 void a sale.
to the

When a debtor fails t0

manner 0f selling the property interests,

an

attend the sale t0 direct the sheriff as

the sheriff s selection
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that Will never constitute

is

conclusive, and the debtor has

waived any challenge

thereafter as t0 the

manner 0f selling the property

interests, as the statute gives

the sheriff broad discretion, absent direction from debtor at the sheriff’s sale.

For the lower court t0 use the assessment 0f execution fees
“less than zero”,

is

neither a

t0

conclude the sale price as being

component of any established standard or Within the outer bounds 0f a

court’s exercise of discretion.

Puckett’s credit bid 0f $100.00

was not

“less than zero”,

and despite

these “subjective preferences” about pricing and valuations of seized property interests,

accepts zero bids,

much less

no

sheriff

a bid tendered t0 be “less than zero”.

This appeal concerns a controversy created because of non-existent standards promoted by
a lower court with a preference to engage in subjective analysis, embracing a pre-disposition t0
disregard standards established through long-standing case law, decades of enforcement 0f the

provisions of the execution statutes, and an inferred rejection 0f any need to articulate a precise

ﬁnding

that has

been embraced within Safaris Unlimited, as a

The lower

court,

now Bergmann),

sale price failed t0 cover costs

to

make

dispute.

that avoids

of execution, and the lower

given their “subj ective preference” t0 determine “price adequacy” on

the consequence 0f execution costs, proposing a “standard” that

of execution

component 0f the

and embraced by Bergmann, would rather adopt a standard

any “ﬁnding ofvaluation”, any time the
court (and

critical

upon sale, a deﬁciency in recovery

costs, automatically equates t0 “gross inadequacy”, rendering needless

any mandate

a ﬁnding of “valuation”.

This court has never expressed an opinion that “execution costs” represent a function in
describing a sale price t0 be adequate or not, and there

is

no established precedents from Which

to

base a “standard” that declares the application 0f execution costs plays a role in determining

whether a sale rendered a price that was “grossly inadequate”, and certainly n0 authority would
conclude such “as a matter 0f law”!

As

t0 the issue

0f sale process and the need for an “irregularity”, Viewed in the context 0f

“additional circumstances”, does this court have the authority t0 alter the language in the statute,

thereby performing a legislative role by imposing a non-eXistent duty upon the sheriff not

expressed Within the statute, t0 require a sheriff t0 perform differently than adopted in longstanding practice that a sheriff has the statutory prerogative in determining the method of
presenting the property interests for sale in a single unit lot 0r independently identiﬁed separate
lots,

absent the direction from the debtor in attendance at the

sale.

The enforcement of these

execution/sale statutes/proceedings has consistently required a debtor t0 be present at the sale, and
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direct the sheriff in that

manner, or the challenge t0 the method 0f sale

is

waived. The

statute,

I.

C.

§1 1-304, has never required a sheriffto sell separately the personal property interests of the debtor,
in the absence

0f the debtor’s presence

at the sale directing the sale

0f the personal property

interests separately.

Given the lower court’s “divergent” position expressed

in

its

commentary 0n April

12,

2019, a comment in response t0 the establishment of a “ﬁnding 0f fact” regarding “valuation”

mandated by Safaris Unlimited (disclosed
p. 825, footnote 1), is

in the denial

of Puckett’s motion on April

12,

2019; R.

not such a “poignant attitude” a reﬂection of more of this unorthodox

reasoning by the lower court, a misguided incorporation 0f the “execution costs” in determining a
sale price’s adequacy,

and the lack of reﬂection upon the applicable statutory standards when

analyzing a sheriffs sale conducted in accordance with the statutory authority vested in a sheriff
t0 determine the process, absent the presence

should be required” and “none

and reasoning used

The lower
and

that

“none

Did not

may

is

t0

is

0f the debtor? This further attitude that “n0 ﬁnding

being [0r apparently will be] made”,

is

not the “standard analysis”

avoid a ﬁnding 0f discretionary abuse.

court’s position

being made”,

0n April

how

12,

2019

that:

“n0 such ﬁnding should be required”,

does that compare to the

the lower court determine a “value” in

its

February

6,

2015 Order, imprecise as

it

appear to be, by the statement that the case ﬁle contents (creditor rights) were “not worth very

much

in the

market value”. Given

that “approximate value” determination,

how

could there be a

“gross inadequacy in the sale price” as Puckett’s opening bid was very consistent with something “not

worth very much”, and

it

was

his bid that

became

the ﬁnal sale price. Faced With the April 12, 2019,

commentary, the lower court has decided instead t0
in this case, but

price and that

no value ﬁnding

makes

is

tell

us that not only was there n0 valuation

even necessary, because the sheriff s fees consumed the

made

entire bid

the price grossly inadequate, as a matter of law.

The excerpt from

the lower court’s Order of February 6, 2015, regarding this issue of

“approximate value” referred to “sale price”, in the following manner:

Those rights might not be worth very much in a market-value considering that the judgment
owed by Vemon (sic) K. Smith remains unpaid after many years. But their market value,

debt

even if much smaller than the judgments’ face value, seemingly cannot be less than zero
Sharon Smith netted at the sheriﬁ’iv sale—less

dollars. Consequently, the eﬁ’ective sale price

than zero dollarS—z's grossly inadequate 0r, if not grossly inadequate, at least too low,
(Memo. Dec. Pg. 6-7) (R. pp. 471-472; 568-569; 626-627) Emphasis added).
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Did our lower court make a valuation determination or not?

It is

an imprecise expression

of valuation, but when a court says something (creditor rights) are not worth very much, that
constitutes a

ﬁnding of value, whether seen

the court, and

The

as he

is

be imprecise or

sheriff has the discretion

some

0n those

in this case, the sheriff wanted to

the advertisement in the notice of sheriff s sale, and he

of Sheriff’s

The

constitutes a

ﬁnding from

ﬁle, the

was

and gives

n0 requirement is imposed on the

vested with the discretion to determine in his best judgment

one case

it

decisions, unless the debtor attends the sale

other manner t0 the sheriff. Otherwise

and order of sale, which

in that

not, as

the order being appealed from.

is

the direction in

t0

sheriff,

how t0 proceed With the manner

remain consistent With both the levy and
selling all

0f the creditor rights contained

one he levied upon and the one he advertised for

sale in the sheriff s Notice

sale.

sheriff logically perceived the creditor rights—property interests Within that entire case ﬁle

t0 reﬂect a series

0f creditor rights, somewhat uncertain because 0f the duplicity of some instruments,

seeing judgments and then renewal judgments, replacing earlier Instruments

0f the renewals, Which

may have

either substituted the original, 0r

merged

by the intended purpose
into another Instrument,

and none 0f the renewals had any stated amount within them.

CONCLUSION
The record

in this case is undisputed

the process undertaken

by

Bergmann declined t0 submit any

obj ection t0

any 0f

the sheriff; declined to submit any claim to assert any exemption,

declined to attend the sheriff’s sale, declined t0 direct the sheriff about selling any interests
separately,

and declined

to authorize her attorney to direct the sheriff to consider

any alternative

process in selling the interests in a manner other than a single unit, Which comprised judgment
interests contained in

an 01d divorce ﬁle with interests that could be overlapping and conﬂicting

if

sold separately t0 the public rather than as a single unit of judgment interests pertaining t0 a

judgment and decree of divorce.
Nothing Within the

statute or case

single unit, consistent with the levy

upon, advertised for
but referring t0

sale,

and the manner

and announced

all interests

law prohibited the sheriff from
in

selling the interests as a

which the judgment

interests

as such at the sheriff” s sale, never describing

were levied
one

interest,

contained in the ﬁle being sold as one unit.

This court should conclude the lower court failed to apply “established and applicable
standards”

When

deciding t0 set aside the sheriff’s sale, as the reasoning 0f the lower court has
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instead

become premised upon n0

applicable standard at

all,

rather a “subjective preference”

expressed, void of any recognition of any “controlling and governing law”.

This court

imposed

is

requested t0

when

have been historically

a debtor declines t0 attend the sale and articles are sold in a single

without objection, and pursuant t0 the sheriffs prerogative, as authorized by
This court

that

standards of waiver and estoppel must be

in resolving this controversy, as the applicable standards that

applied t0 sheriffs sale
unit,

conﬁrm the recognized

is

requested to

conﬁrm the express language contained

embrace the authority intended by the Legislature

enforced for decades, within which statute

is

to

statute.

in the execution statutes

be vested in a sheriff and has been

the right 0f a debtor t0 participate in the sale, a

requirement t0 reserve any basis to later challenge the method 0f
presence and direction, the legislative intent will be

strictly

sale,

and absent the debtor’s

enforced that conﬁrms the sheriff

possesses the sole authority and prerogative t0 select the method 0f sale of the personal property
articles, items,

and

interests

0f a debtor, and n0 court

is

vested with a jurisdictional basis t0 engage

a debtor’s challenge t0 the method 0f sale, upon the failure 0f the debtor t0 be present and preserve
that challenge regarding the

manner of sales.

Puckett does request this court reverse the lower court’s Order setting aside the sale, and
reinstate the validity 0fthe sale, concluding that the

and governing laws

to support its reasoning

when

lower court failed t0 apply the proper standards

setting aside the sheriffs sale.

Respectfully submitted this 3 1“ day of January, 2020.
/S/ Vernon K. Smith

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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